SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA)
A Reflection on Opportunities and Complexities
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Abstract

This article analyses the opportunities and complexities of the SADC mediation in Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA) in facilitating and operationalising the principles and values of peace, security, human rights and democracy as set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty. It attempts to interrogate the extent to which the regional grouping’s mechanisms for enforcing its principles and values have been successful.

The article argues that despite SADC’s noble commitment to promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices, as well as encouraging the observance of universal human rights, peace and security, the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis shows that, in practice, the operationalisation of SADC protocol principles and values have been a sorry saga of delays, secrecy, purported agreements and nothing concrete coming out of it. Using the Zimbabwe case study, this article further argues that SADC either lacks appropriate power and authority or is reluctant to hold member states accountable. This seems so, given that as a regional body, it has allowed itself to be utterly inadequate to the task envisioned by the organ in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. The paper concludes that the sum of all this has had the effect of exposing SADC and it being perceived as a weak regional organisation.

Keywords: SADC Mediation, Regional Integration, Security Community, Accountability, Trust, Monitoring and Evaluation, Zimbabwe.
**Introduction**

In the Gaborone communiqué of 28 June 1996, the Republics of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo, took a decision to establish the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS). This decision took notice of Article 9 of the SADC treaty which established the organ. This was pursuant to Article 4 of the SADC treaty, which expects member states to conduct themselves in accordance with the core principles of sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity and peaceful settlement of disputes. Through the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS) commonly referred to as the Protocol or Organ, the regional body reaffirmed the need to achieve solidarity peace and security through close cooperation. Article 2 (a) of the Protocol seeks to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state and inter-state conflict and aggression. Further to this, Article 2 (b) provides for the promotion of co-operation among state parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions. Furthermore, in terms of Article 2 (c) the regional body is expected to promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to that end.

However the extent to which these Articles are enforceable by SADC is questionable and the *modus operandi* for achieving this in practice is unclear. The operationalisation of the protocol is still littered with grey areas, one of the most intractable being the extent to which member states can in practice be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The greatest challenge seems to be the extent to which member states can recognize and re-affirm the principles of strict respect to sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of member states and at the same time enforce values and principles of the treaty? What seems to be emerging in practice is that, whatever the intentions of SADC leaders, the grouping lacks a mechanism to enforce its principles if they are violated. This article argues that Deutsch, Sidney, Robert, Maurice Jr, Martin, Raymond, Francis, & Richard's (1957:3-5), powerful concept of a security community theory, can potentially be used to understand and explain the means by which peace can
be maintained in a regional organisation such as SADC. This paper argues that this theory can further be used as a lens to examine how peaceful resolutions can be reached in a region such as SADC, where “political turmoil” and mounting threats to peace and security exist. In SADC such conflicts are, exemplified by for instance instabilities and conflicts in Madagascar, the reluctance of the political elite to open up political space for competition in Swaziland, the seemingly intractable economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe, as well as a fragility of the peace accord in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Thus, the paper seeks to contribute to regional integration and security, in the sense that whilst much has been written on SADC itself, the potential of the OPDS to realise the SADC Treaty’s vision of a security community has not been interrogated and analysed in theory and practice within the context of the role of SADC on the Zimbabwe crisis. This thus presents a compelling case through which to examine SADC’s actual workings, strengths and weaknesses. The article argues that the obstinate Zimbabwe crisis mirrors how SADC’s principles and values were tested and acted upon in practice and the precarious position the OPDS found itself as it attempted to operationalise the principles of peace, security, human rights and democracy as set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty.

**SADC Historical Overview**

In 1973 the White Paper on Defence, in South Africa first introduced the concept of the ‘Total Strategy’, which was further elaborated in the succeeding White Papers on Defence of 1975 and 1977 (Smith, 1990:10). South Africa argued that it faced a “total onslaught”, aimed at “the overthrow of the then constitutional order and its replacement by a communist-oriented, black government” (Geldenhuys, 1984:209). The ‘Total National Strategy’ concept was later developed and adopted as official policy in 1978. Its objective was to counter the perceived threat of a concerted attack on the “South African” society. The ‘total strategy’ was officially defined as a comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to the state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve national aims within the framework of specific policies (South Africa, 1977:5). South Africa’s foreign policy towards its neighbours during that epoch was widely destabilization. It marked a policy of aggressive military and economic interventions, both direct and
indirect in the region. These internal developments reflected South Africa’s regional policy and in turn stimulated conflict, tension, and military expenditure both inside South Africa and in the wider region. On the other hand, and as far back as 1969, independent Africa’s opposition to apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa was formally coordinated in the form of the ‘Lusaka Manifesto’. This document later became a touchstone of the Front Line States’ political alliance. However, up until the mid-1970s South Africa was well insulated from proximity with its independent, anti-apartheid neighbours by a buffer zone of colonial territories.

The regional outlook however changed dramatically from the mid-1970s onwards. The ‘Front Line States’ formed an alliance to fight apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa. This political alliance comprised of Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Botswana (Smith, 1990:6). The ‘front line’ was a metaphor used to denote the geographical and political boundary between the independent, black-ruled states of the southern African region and the colonial and minority-ruled ones, which started with independent Tanzania’s uncompromising condemnation of apartheid. Various factors combined to create a regional environment which became increasingly unfavourable to the South African government’s interests, and led to a shift in its regional strategy. For example, Angola and Mozambique’s independence boosted popular resistance in South Africa. The 1976 Soweto uprising and the brutal state repression of the youths involved also refocused international criticism against South Africa. On the political front, the death of the young political activist, Steve Biko while in detention in 1977 further heightened international censure and catalysed internal opposition.

South Africa’s ‘buffer zone’ began to disintegrate when Angola and Mozambique became independent in 1975. Independent Angola offered refuge and military bases to the ANC and SWAPO. Luanda became the headquarters of SWAPO in exile, and SWAPO guerrillas were able to move easily across Namibia’s northern border, using Angolan territory as a rear base. Mozambique offered military rear base support to ZANU, and hospitality to the ANC, although its headquarters remained in Lusaka, Zambia (Smith, 1990:9). It was against this background of increasing internal, regional and international pressure on apartheid, that South Africa shaped the regional strategy which it pursued for most of the 1980s. From 1978 to 1989 the strategy was pre-eminent associated with the leadership of Prime Minister and later State President P.W. Botha. Apartheid
South Africa believed that it stood alone in Africa against a ‘total onslaught’ by the Communist world spearheaded by subversive agents allied to Cuba and African proxies. It therefore became preoccupied with the defence and security of the apartheid state (Smith, 1990:10). In response to the South African ‘Total National Strategy’ by 1979, the Frontline states (FLS) had laid a firm plan for an alternative regional economic body, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

Established in 1980, SADCC was initially comprised of the independent states of the southern African region, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its goals were the promotion of regional co-operation through joint development projects, mobilising development assistance and reducing the economic dependence of member states on apartheid South Africa. In response to a rapidly changing regional and international political climate SADCC negotiated a new treaty. In 1992, SADCC was dissolved, and ten founding member states concluded a treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This was an international body with legal persona and mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions. The treaty was signed in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992 (SADC, 1992). The SADC treaty has common economic, environmental, political, peace and security goals for its members. As evident in its first three objectives, SADC seeks to achieve development and economic growth; evolve common political values, systems and institutions and promote and defend peace and security (SADC, 1995). Three major aspects that currently distinguish SADC from SADCC are that, firstly it included the regional power, South Africa, secondly, its primary goal went beyond economic integration to encompass regional integration and thirdly, its mandate extended to the political and security spheres. As a regional body SADC is concerned with the promotion of sub-regional political and economic integration and security (Olonisakin & Levitt, 1999:70). To this end, in 1996 the SADC Summit launched the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in pursuant of Article 9 of the SADC treaty.

**Envisaged Role of SADC’s OPDS**

The heads of states and governments of SADC launched the protocol which established the OPDS at an Extraordinary Summit on 28 June 1996. The official communiqué establishing the protocol stated that the organ would operate at summit, ministerial and
technical levels independently of other SADC structures and it would incorporate the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the Front Line States. As such, the organ took over the security mandate of the Front Line States (FLS) coalition, established in 1976 and disbanded in 1994, which sought to secure the liberation of southern African countries and counter regional destabilization by apartheid South Africa.

The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was adopted in Blantyre on 14 August 2001. It re-affirmed, recognised and committed SADC member states to regional arrangements dealing with close cooperation on matters of politics, defence and security (SADC, 2001). The protocol empowers SADC to take forcible military intervention in intra-state conflict to forestall large-scale warring and to ensure democracy by protecting the interests of a legitimate government. It furthermore, permits SADC to take action in interstate conflict to prevent cross-border aggression or the threat of such aggression or disagreement over territorial boundaries (SADC, 1996). The OPDS is governed by a troika, comprising of the current Chair, the out-going Chair and the in-coming Chair of SADC. The troika system facilitates consultation and leadership by the present, past and next SADC chairpersons. The OPDS consults at summit, ministerial and technical levels. Its most active component is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). This Organ is the foremost institution of SADC mandated to address issues relating to political stability, conflict prevention, management and resolution, democracy and human rights as well as issues pertaining to peace and security.

The general objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region. The specific objects of the OPDS are to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within territories of state parties and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charter and Conventions of the African Union and the United Nations. The Organ also seeks to develop a collective security capacity including a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and promoting peace-making and peace-keeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security in the sub-region. It further seeks to promote political co-operation among states and the evolution of common political values and institutions. More importantly, under Article, 2 (f) the organ is mandated to consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed (Article, 2 SADC, 1996).
SADC Mutual Defence Pact

The decision by SADC heads of states at their 2003 Summit to approve the establishment of the sub-region’s Mutual Defence Pact has been of fundamental significance. Its adoption potentially and significantly contributes towards the attainment of a security community. In its definition of “destabilise”, the pact acknowledges the best interests of both the state and its people. Article 1 (2) (c) of the pact for example provides for the necessity for constitutional changes of government. It however recognises the inadequacy of the state by defining collective self-defence, stipulating that states can only achieve sustainable peace, stability and security in the sub-region through participation and working together. The pact also acknowledges the limits of sovereignty; it notes that the sovereign state is in the medium and long term inimical to the interdependence of states of the southern African sub-region.

Theorising SADC Mediation - Security Community Theory

The security community theory propounded by Deutsch, et al. (1957:3-5), theorises the means by which peace can be maintained in a regional organisation, such as SADC. Deutsch et al. (1957:5) conceptualises a security community as a group of people which has become integrated, and where integration is defined as the attainment, within a territory of a sense of community and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among the population. Deutsch, et al. (1957:5) elaborates further, the idea of peaceful change by defining it as the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force. This article recognises this as compatible with the provisions of the SADC Organ. For example it notes that Article 2 (b) (i) of the Protocol mandates the organ to decisively preside over large-scale violence between sections of the population, including acts of genocide and gross violations of human rights (SADC, 1996).

The concept of security community emanates from the work of Karl Deutsch, who defined it as an assembly of people who think that they have come to an accord on the idea that social problems must and can only be settled by means of peaceful change (Taylor, 2014:136). Within this contextualisation, Deutsch et al’s (1957) security community theory can be taken to mean the absence of interstate war, including violence and
violations of human rights. Taylor (2014:136) views a security community as a geographical space where large-scale utilisation of violence has become very improbable, if not inconceivable. For Wendt (1995:73) a security community is a social structure composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war. This is consistent with Ngoma (2004:412) who posit that a security community is a socially based phenomenon, which is premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment, which enable states to evolve a sense of security through peaceful and democratic means. Waever (1998:104) depicts it as a constellation, where states do not expect to use war as a means in their quarrels. Taylor (2014:136) therefore argues that, the notion that an inter-subjective set of norms has evolved whereby actors within a region share common ideas and understandings is integral to the idea of a security community. This therefore implies that those states that inhabit a security community have constructed not simply a stable order, but in fact a stable peace.

In Adler and Barnett’s (1998:34) analytic framework of a security community mutual trust and collective identity among group states are necessary conditions for dependable expectations of peaceful change, and are thus normative benchmarks of a security community. Emerging from Adler and Barnett’s (1998:34) framework is that, a community emerges and is set in motion by precipitating conditions that motivate states to adopt similar orientations and engage in cooperation and policy coordination. There is therefore an assumption that, when this happens over time a positive interplay of interactions, institutions, social learning and other factors generate the requisite trust and transnational identity, which are reciprocal and mutually reinforcing in the evolution and co-evolution of the basic tenets of regional integration. It can thus be deduced that, viewed in terms of security community theory, SADC can be viewed as an emerging security community, especially when and if focus is placed on regional security arrangements. The emergence of a security community however develops in phases, as described in the following section.

**Security Community – The Phases**

Community security theorists trace how security dynamics might through processes of confidence building and security interaction evolve into security communities where peace is predictable and violent conflict virtually unimaginable (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957).
Adler and Barnett (1998:30) identified these phases as nascent, ascendant and mature. They point out that, nascent security communities can be viewed as transnational regions comprising sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998:30). They further argue that, at the other end of the continuum, a mature security community would include a mutual aid aspect and a system of rules that lie somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional centralised government. In their view it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system (Adler and Barnett, 1998:30). Adler and Barnett (1998:30) however, argue that security communities are very rare. They therefore advise that, it is would therefore be most useful to imagine them as evolving through different stages, ‘nascent’ security communities, through to ‘ascendant’ ones and then finally ‘mature’ ones.

Using Deutsch et al’s (1957) theorisation, it can thus be deduced that members of a security community, may not and should not be limited to states but should include individuals, citizens, groups and populations. Alagappa (1998:624-626) views this multidimensional arrangement covering not merely relations between states, but also issues such as democratic values and human rights as comprehensive security. Cawthra (2008:161) closely parallels the concept of comprehensive security with the notion of human security. Cawthra (2008:161) argues that human security ostensibly privileges the security of people over security of states. In Cawthra’s (2008:161) view human security can thus be summed up as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.

As earlier pointed out by Deutsch et al. (1957:5) a security community therefore comprises of a group of people that has become integrated, with dependable expectations of peaceful change. These are not states but rather the population of the territory covered by the community. This constructivist view goes deeper than merely describing the stages of security communities. In Adler and Barnett’s (1998:31) view a security community has shared values and meanings. It is however this article’s contention that, despite the fact that the SADC Organ enshrines noble principles and values and is desirous of ensuring close co-operation on matters of politics, defence and security and the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, such principles do not inspire much confidence. This is so for the reasons that, SADC has in practice often fallen short of successfully
enforcing the observance of the values of human rights, rule of law, democratic national
institutions and protection of the people from state sponsored violence by some of its
predatory member states.

This is contrary to Deustch et al’s (1957) thesis which proposes conditions essential
for a successful security community. Two such conditions seem more relevant in a
pluralistic security community. Deustch, et al (1957:66) firstly, advocates that governments
should have the capacity to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions
quickly and adequately. They also argue that such responsiveness should further be
buttressed by established political habits, and institutions favouring mutual
communication and consultation. Secondly, Deustch, et al. (1957:66) are of the view that
there is need for compatibility in major values relevant to political decision-making and
policy making, embodying basic political ideologies such as democracy, human rights
and good governance.

**Trust and Accountability**

Critically important variables in Deusch’s theorisation of security community are trust and
accountability since communities depend on mutual trust (Fukuyama 2001:8-9). Trust and
accountability are at the core of western democratic intellectual, constitutional and legal
heritage. Hobbes for example, was concerned with providing incentives for compliance
where citizens were envisaged as self-interested and distrusting individuals. On the
contrary Locke put trust at the core of the relationships between citizens and their
governments: society gives power to governors “whom society hath set over itself, with
the express or tacit Trust, That it shall be employed for their good and the preservation
conceptualises trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest,
and cooperative behaviour on commonly shared norms on the part of members of a
community”. Trust is thus a prerequisite for regional cooperation, for the resolution of
collective security problems and for effective democratic governance.

Fukuyama further argues that the most effective organisations are based on
communities of shared ethical values...such communities do not necessarily require
extensive contracts or legal regulations of their relations, because prior moral consensus
gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1995:26). Similarly, Tilly
(2005:12) views trust as a process of “placing valued outcomes at risk of others’
malfeasance, mistakes or failures. Trust plays a central role in social cooperation, as it acts as a ‘lubricant’ of social interactions, thereby facilitating cooperation, collective actions and alliances. However, despite the importance of trust in regional integration, and especially mediation, theory on the subject has not been fully developed. There is still thus a need for a general theory that accounts for the element of trust in mediation processes (Senecah, 2004:21).

The concept of trust also has a long history in western political philosophy and political science and organisations and management theories. For example, political philosophy emphasises rational choice and game theories (analysing the role of individuals’ motivations to trust and cooperate), the role of trust in the formation of citizenship and democracy (Laurian, 2009:371). Rational choice theory dominates the dispositional, or psychometric, perspective of trust which focuses on individual-level processes that lead to perceptions of trustworthiness and decisions of trust. This perspective views trust as a psychological state of mind comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, 1998:395). The rational choice perspective postulates that individuals analyse the cost and benefits of collaborating, trusting, or being trustworthy in specific situations.

The socio-cultural perspective focuses on trust as a social construct that characterises human relations. It posits that trust is formed by, and simultaneously shapes relational, historical, social and cultural contexts. Some scholars (Barber, 1983) adopt a systemic view of trust, viewing it as part of wider social systems, while others (Tilly, 2005) focus on its transactional and contingent characteristics. Social trust is necessary in establishing social relations. It enables social cohesion and provides the confidence necessary for orderly social and economic exchanges and political life. Trust is also critically important in the creation of and maintenance of social bonds and group identities. In turn, a sense of group identity promotes the legitimacy of institutions, encouraging voluntary deference to authorities and compliance with rules (Laurian, 2009:372). Braithwaite (1998) and Kramer, et al. (1996) cited in Laurian, (2009:372) argue that shared social values are the foundation of social trust, including trust in government, in institutions and in others. Laurian (2009:371) further asserts that shared norms of trust mean that the actions of institutions are more predictable, enhancing the capacity and willingness of institutions to
act in the interest of others. Trust is thus founded on the ethical norms, on shared concepts of moral virtue.

In his concept of the radius of trust Fukuyama (2001:8-9) posits that all groups embodying social capital have a certain radius of trust. The radius of trust is that circle of people among whom co-operative norms are operative. Given that trust facilitates cooperation, it is an important element of social capital. Putnam sees social trust as “improving the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action (Putnam, 1993:167).

A regional organisation such as SADC should ideally be thought of as consisting of a series of concentric and overlapping radii of trust. Such trust is a key element in what Deutsch et al (1957) identifies as “we-feeling” in successfully integrated regional organisations.

Democratic theory further emphasise the role of values and accountability. Like trust, the concept of accountability also has a long tradition in both political science and accounting, but only more recently in public administration and development administration (Lindberg, 2013:203). Locke’s theory of the superiority of representational democracy is built on the notion that accountability is only possible when the governed are separated from governors (Locke, 1980 [1690] cited in Lindberg, 2013:203). As observed by Hood et al, cited in Lindberg (2013:203) Jeremy Bentham’s principle, that “the more we are watched, the better we behave” best captures the need for accountability. Accountability is associated with the act of discretionary governing, typically understood as the authoritative allocation of resources and exercising control and coordination.

This in turn points to the critical need for an identifiable locus of authority. Within this context Mill, (1964[1861]:332) famously argued that, “responsibility is null and void when nobody knows who is responsible....there must be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done and the whole blame of what is ill.” According to Blind (2011:8) accountability is associated with the notions of responsibility, integrity, democracy, fairness and justice. Ola and Effiong (1999) cited in Adejuwon (2012:27) refer to accountability as the ability to furnish satisfactory analyses and explanation of one’s actions in the process of discharging one’s responsibilities at all levels, whether technical, administrative, political, financial, or otherwise. In Hondenghorn’s (1998:7) view accountability rests on both giving an account and on being held to account.
Adejuwon (2012:28) postulates that the concept of accountability involves distinct stages; answerability and enforcement. Answerability is the obligation to provide information about decisions and actions and to justify to the public and to institutions of oversight. On the other hand, enforcement denotes the notion that the public or institution responsible for accountability can sanction the offending party or remedy the contravening behaviour (Adejuwon 2012:28). Accountability is therefore a key determinant of the state of governance, as it promotes good governance in public affairs (Polidano and Hulme, 1997:68). It also constitutes a powerful tool in the struggle for human rights implementation (Okechukwu, 2007:32 in (Adejuwon 2012:27). Adejuwon (2012:27) posits that accountability has to be concerned with ensuring that those who wield power exercise it responsibly, so that they can be held accountable for their actions or inactions. Thus the demand in democracies is that there must be responsible use of power and authority and clear means of administrative accountability. Within this context, accountability and governance should thus be viewed as flip sides of the same coin (Carrington, et al. 2008:35).

Emerging from this discussion is therefore that, accountability fosters good, ethical governance and is fundamentally needful for building public trust in leadership (Adejuwon 2012:34). This view is predicated on the assumption that the normative basis of democracy is emphasis on regulated political competition through political means, with the expectation that conflicts are resolved by institutional means such as free and fair elections and devoid of electoral fraud and violence (Maoz and Russert, 1993:625). Thus, using the theory of security community and the related concepts of trust and accountability as analytical lenses, this article interrogates and reflects on SADC mediation in Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA). The intention is to unravel both opportunities and complexities and paradoxes in the operationalisation of SADC’s principles and values, how they were expressed and acted upon in practice and the precarious position the OPDS found itself as it attempted to enforce the principles of peace, security, human rights and democracy set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty as well as the provisions of the protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation.

**Tracking the SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe’s GPA**

The Global Political Agreement (GPA) which brought about the inclusive “power sharing” government in Zimbabwe came as a result of a long drawn-out SADC mediation process.
Article 5 of the SADC treaty espouses the regional grouping’s objectives. Article 22 requires states to conclude and ratify protocols spelling out the goals, scope and manner of co-operation and integration in seven sectors one of which covers politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security (SADC, 1992). The primary litmus test for determining peace and security in the region is election legitimacy through free, fair and non-violent elections. To give effect to that ideal of free and fair elections, the SADC Heads of States, signed the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Democratic elections. The SADC Guidelines laid down principles for conducting democratic elections, the mandate and constitution of a SADC Election Observers’ Mission, the guidelines for election observation and the responsibilities of member states holding elections.

Consequently, the Republic of Zimbabwe introduced two new electoral laws in Zimbabwe in 2004. The first was the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Act [Chapter 2:12] (No. 22 of 2004). This Act gave ZEC a monopoly over voter education and electoral process issues in Zimbabwe. The second law was the Electoral Act [Chapter 2.13] (No. 25 of 2004), which repealed the previous Electoral Act [Chapter 2.01] and its amendments. The new Electoral Act [Chapter 2.13] (No. 25 of 2004) introduced a number of electoral reforms, amongst them voting on a single day and counting of ballots at polling centres. The Act further created an Electoral Court to expeditiously hear election petitions.

It also provided for the invitation and accreditation of election monitors and observers and excluded the notorious section 158 of the previous Electoral Act [Chapter 2.01], which previously empowered the State President to make Statutory Instruments (SI), as he considered necessary and desirable to ensure that any election was “properly and efficiently” conducted and to deal with any other matters connected to the election. The much criticised Section 158 (2) further empowered the State President to provide for such Statutory Instruments (SI) to suspend or amend any provision of the Electoral Act or any law in so far as it applied to an election. The removal of this Section which virtually conferred unconstrained law-making powers to the President was a milestone in post-independent Zimbabwe’s electoral legal framework and was roundly hailed as a positive development and step in the right direction.

The Zimbabwean government claimed that the two new laws were compliant with the SADC Guidelines on Democratic Elections. This led the then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs in his address to the Commission for Human Rights in Geneva in 2005 to argue that:
...to match and comply with norms and standards evolving in the SADC region in line with SADC Principles and Guidelines governing the conduct of democratic elections adopted by the SADC Summit in Mauritius, we have effected electoral reforms.....above all the reforms have ensured greater participation of the population in the democratic process (Kriger, 2008:362).

The Minister further claimed that besides being in compliance with the SADC Guidelines, Zimbabwe was also a regional leader in democracy (Kriger, 2008:362). However challenged by a group of Zimbabweans in the diaspora who appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge the denial of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2.13] (No 25 of 2004) to give them the right to use the postal ballot, the Minister however seemed to contradict himself when in his opposing affidavit, he argued that "the SADC Guidelines and Principles were not enforceable in Zimbabwe's jurisdiction, although it had nevertheless endeavoured to bring electoral legislation in line with the guidelines" (Kriger, 2008:363).

Thus, to some extent, there was progress with, for example, the principles governing elections which have been accepted by all SADC countries. However, there clearly was need for more concerted commitment to some erosion of sovereignty by member states. The ceding of some elements of sovereignty, to intergovernmental or supranational processes was still to take place, and this is a challenge that SADC will have to face up to. In Zimbabwe, in spite of the responsible Minister’s claims, it can still be argued that the electoral laws of 2004 still fell far short of SADC guidelines and other democratic standards. Some of the main shortcomings were that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s (ZEC) Secretariat was seen as lacking independence, inclusiveness and impartiality. The President was still empowered to appoint all the Commissioners. Further to this, given the partisan character of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Secretariat, its monopoly over voter education was unduly restrictive and intrusive. Furthermore, the Electoral Act [Chapter 2.13] (No. 25 of 2004) deviated from the SADC guidelines by disenfranchising millions of Zimbabweans in the diaspora. In terms of election observation and monitoring, the rules governing election monitoring further sidelined civic organisations (Kriger, 2008:364).

Election observation was also restricted to countries that were deemed “friendly” to the Zimbabwean government. Some thorny issues thus still remained entrenched in Zimbabwe’s electoral environment, including that, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
still worked with the long discredited Office of the Registrar General to compile and update the voters roll. Most worrying was a 2010 report compiled by a local pro-democracy Non-Governmental Organisation, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), which showed that approximately twenty-seven percent (27%) of names listed on the Zimbabwe voters roll constituted dead people. It was also extremely worrying that the ZESN report revealed that two thousand three hundred and forty-four (2 344) people were aged between one hundred and one (101) and one hundred and ten (110) years. Nine others were recorded as born between the years 1890 and 1900, a scenario most unlikely in a country which has registered a much lower life expectancy in recent years (Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 2010; Veritas Bill Watch, 2011).

After the electoral reforms alluded to earlier, Zimbabwe held two sets of historic elections in 2008. The relatively free and fair 29 March elections yielded an inconclusive presidential outcome necessitating a second round on 27 June. In the months between 29 March and 27 June, ZANU PF allegedly unleashed a systematic and brutal campaign of violence against the opposition. ZANU PF officials and ‘war veterans’ beat and tortured suspected MDC activists and supporters in base camps established across the provinces (Human Rights Watch, 2008:14). Even though, the MDC rival candidate withdrew citing a brutal campaign of violence, ZANU PF proceeded with the one-candidate election and its candidate scored an overwhelming “victory” leading to international condemnation. The SADC Election Observer Team concluded that, the 27 June presidential run-off elections did not conform to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic elections and that the elections did not therefore represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe. Similarly, the African Union Observer Team declared that in their considered view, the elections fell short of accepted standards of the African Union (AU) Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (Masunungure and Badza, 2010:222).

International condemnation deepened the Zimbabwe crisis, precipitating a search for a negotiated settlement, which led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two MDCs and ZANU PF on 21 July 2008. The principals of the three participating political parties later agreed to a historic power sharing agreement on 15 September 2008, now commonly referred to as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) (Masunungure and Badza, 2010:222). Notwithstanding this agreement, several extraordinary meetings of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS) as well as emergency meetings of the SADC Summit were convened to amongst
other things activate the implementation of the GPA without much success. After a long delay, on the 4th of August 2010, the party principals met and agreed on an “implementation matrix” which fixed time frames for the implementation of twenty-four (24) agreed items. The matrix was endorsed by the SADC Windhoek Summit on the 17th of August 2010. This matrix still remained largely unimplemented including the fifteen items for immediate implementation of the Windhoek Summit.

Other items of importance to the nation were also not implemented; neither the Land Audit Commission nor the National Economic Council was constituted. Media issues to do with the Broadcasting Authority Board, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Board and the Mass Media Trust were also not attended to, and this was a cause for grave concern (Veritas Bill Watch, 2011). The GPA which was the basis for creating a “power-sharing” government barely dented the power of President Mugabe and ZANU (PF) (Krieger, 2012:14). The lack of implementation mechanisms provided in the agreement thus led Matyszak (2008:3) to remark that “the bulk of the 15 page Agreement comprised pious statements devoid of any practical consequence and which were little more than political posturing”. Thus in practice the “Government of National Unity” (GNU) under the GPA of September 2009 was unable to implement the central provisions of the GPA, leading to repeated breakdowns in communication between the President and Prime Minister. The tense political standoff largely inhibited the construction of effective and lasting institutions. For example in accordance with the power-sharing deal, a National Security Council (NSC) with multiparty civilian representation was intended to replace the Joint Operations Command (JOC), however in practice, six months passed before the NSC held a pro forma introductory meeting.

Zimbabwe’s GPA was intended to prepare the political process for a generally acceptable election after the debacle of the June 2008 presidential run-off, which had followed ZANU (PF)’s defeat in March 2008 (Raftopoulos, 2013:971). A key area of contestation between the GPA parties was the struggle for constitutional reform. As pointed out by Raftopoulos (2013:971) article VI of the GPA set out the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution for themselves, also stipulating that the process would be carried out by a Select Committee of Parliament composed of parties to the GPA. After an arduous three years of delays, obstructions, logistical and financial squabbles, as well as a problematic outreach programme, a draft
constituent was produced by the Parliamentary Select Committee, (COPAC) in July 201 (Raftopoulos, 2013:973).

Although the draft constitution was viewed as a compromise document, containing a disturbing concentration of executive powers, it put in place fundamental changes including; presidential term limits, more accountability of the security and judicial services, a more independent National Prosecuting Authority, limited devolution of power, and a much more comprehensive bill of citizenship rights (Raftopoulos, 2013:973). Consequently, a referendum was carried out on 16 March 2013, with the overwhelming majority of voters, 3 079 966 voting for the new constitution, while a small number 179 489 voted against (Raftopoulos, 2013:974). SADC commended Zimbabwe for holding a “credible, free and fair constitutional referendum” and urged the GPA parties once again to “…finalise the outstanding issues in the implementation of the GPA and preparations for holding free and fair elections in Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2013:974).

However, as had happened in the contested 2008 elections and in contravention of the GPA, the state President unilaterally took a position on the setting of an election date. What was worrying was the fact that this decision was made notwithstanding the unfinished reform agenda as set out in the GPA, and against the persistent recommendations of several SADC summits on the need for a full implementation of the GPA before an election. On 2 May the Director of the Centre for Democracy in Southern Africa, who many believed to have been working in cahoots with one party to the GPA, ZANU (PF) filed an urgent court application seeking an order directing the President to proclaim elections by no later than 30 June 2013. This matter was subsequently heard by the Constitutional Court, as set out under the new constitution and as many had predicted, the court ruled by a majority decision, supporting the court application, that elections had to be set for 31 July 2013.

Noting that most areas agreed to by the GPA parties in 2011 under the framework of “Zimbabwe Elections Road Map and Timelines had not been “adequately implemented”, the SADC facilitator in the mediation, reported that, the decision to hold elections on 31 July was “fraught with legal contestation, political dispute and heightened tensions even within the Inclusive Government (SADC, 2013a - Report of the SADC Facilitator, 15 June; Raftopoulos, 2013:976). On 15 June 2013, the SADC summit held in Maputo endorsed the facilitator’s report and acknowledged the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The regional group however recommended that Zimbabwe engage the Constitutional Court
to seek time “beyond the 31 July deadline” for holding Harmonised Elections (SADC, 2013b - Maputo Communiqué, 15 June). ZANU (PF) made a court appeal for the “extension” of the election date, which many observers foresaw was designed to fail, as it was submitted without consulting the other parties to the GPA (Raftopoulos, 2013:977). As predicted the Constitutional Court denied the appeal and confirmed the July 31 date, despite a clear lack of preparedness for the elections. The International Crisis Group cited in Raftopoulos, (2013:977) reported with concern that, the voters roll was in shambles, the security sector remained unreformed, the public media was imbalanced, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was underfunded and lacked time for preparation, and ZEC failed to provide an electronic voters’ roll in breach of Section 21 of the electoral Act.

The Harmonised Elections went ahead on 31 July 2013 and the extent of ZANU (PF) victory shocked many observers, Robert Mugabe who was President in the inclusive government under the GPA received sixty-one percent (61%) in the presidential vote, compared to the 44% he had won in 2008 and Morgan Tsvangirai’s votes plunged from 48% he had won in 2008 to 33% in 2013. A similar trend obtained in parliamentary seats, ZANU (PF) increased its number of seats from 99 in 2008 to 159 in 2013, whilst the MDC-T’s seats plunged from 99 in 2008 to 49 in 2013 (Raftopoulos, 2013:977). Although SADC was unwilling to declare the election “fair” because of the absence of an electronic copy of the voters roll, it declared the poll “free, peaceful and generally credible” (SADC Election Observation Mission, Summary Statement, 2 August 2013). Alexander and McGregor (2013:760) have however argued that the ZANU (PF) victory in the 2013 elections was intimately linked to the remaking of the state institutions and political parties, and the increasing importance of patronage economies. Clearly there were also extensive violations of the Constitution and the Electoral Act (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2013:31). However the Solidarity Peace Trust in its detailed analysis of voting patterns shows how difficult it is to read the effects of fraud of various kinds on results, and cautions against any direct equation of abuses with ZANU (PF)’s successes. It also insists that the information available is inconclusive (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2013:31).

Thus, as argued by Raftopoulos, (2013:986) the major priority in mediating in the Zimbabwe crisis was to ensure stabilisation and not democratisation. He further observed that despite persistent calls by SADC for the full implementation of the GPA prior to the 31 July 2013 elections, there was little evidence, beyond diplomatic exhortations, that
SADC was willing or able to take further actions in the face of ZANU (PF)’s unwillingness to fully implement the GPA. Thus it becomes worrying that SADC just eventually settled for minimal electoral reforms, a new constitution and the absence of the levels of violence that marred the 2008 plebiscite. Thus as pointed out by Palloti (2013:18) diplomatic efforts at SADC mediation were caught between the redistributive nationalistic rhetoric of an authoritarian regime that trampled on human rights in the name of pursuing social justice, and the instrumentality of human rights in the neo-liberal development paradigm of the west. Palloti (2013:18) further notes that by embracing the later, SADC failed to address both the colonial legacies of inequality in the region, and the upholding of human rights in southern Africa.

**A Reflection on the SADC Mediation – Lessons Learnt**

There have been serious challenges with the implementation of GPA. The MDCs persistently raised concerns about the appointment of provincial governors, diplomats, senior public officials, the Attorney General and the Reserve Bank Governor. On the other hand members of ZANU (PF) often complained about the continuation of sanctions imposed on its senior figures, the reported establishment of parallel structures by the Prime Minister’s office and the generally anti-ZANU (PF) radio broadcasts beamed from abroad. While these issues could have been solved, one mistake SADC made was that it failed to establish impartial structures to effectively monitor and evaluate the implementation of the GPA. Instead a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) were established, to ensure compliance, which comprised of members of the three coalition partners. This arrangement was fundamentally flawed and fallacious in that it was based on the misleading assumption of self-monitoring, thus largely leaving the full implementation of the GPA vulnerable to non-compliance.

However, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) now seems to be resolving this fallacy of self-monitoring, as it is setting up a Mediation Unit. This stemmed from a recognition that one structural flaw has been SADC’s lack of a standing regional mediation architecture. The envisaged structures include: the Panel of Elders, the Mediation Reference Group, and the Mediation Support Unit in the Organ (Dzinesa, 2013:199). This is commendable as in the past the regional body’s mediation has often been on an *ad hoc* basis. The establishment of SADC’s mediation architecture, which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that encourages peaceful
settlement of disputes through regional arrangements, it appears, is most likely to go a long way in enhancing coherence, synergy and the effectiveness of SADC's mediation efforts.

Such a mediation architecture is imperative, given that the inclusive Zimbabwe government after signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a Global Political Agreement (GPA) could not implement issues that had been agreed between parties and SADC, it is evident that there has been a degree of failure to give effect and expression, especially to the SADC Summits' recommendations on unresolved and outstanding issues. Despite SADC's noble commitment, to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices and to encourage the observance of universal human rights, the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis has been a sorry saga of delays, secrecy, purported agreements and nothing concrete coming out of it (Veritas Bill Watch, 2011).

As argued by Nathan (2013:204) scholars often fall into the trap of claiming that SADC has been successful in the political and security spheres by virtue of having constructed an institutional framework comprising a treaty, protocols and mechanisms for security cooperation, peace-making and democratic governance. Nathan (2013:204) however argues against such a formalistic criterion, as he views it as grossly inadequate, in that it ignores pertinent questions, such as: Is the behaviour of member states consistent with the principles and objectives set out in the declarations? Does SADC take corrective action when a member state violates principles? And what is the actual impact of the mechanisms and declarations?

The Zimbabwe crisis is a classic example of a government in SADC which is reluctant to go along with the commitments it has signed, expressed through selective application, delayed implementation or just non-compliance (Taylor, 2014:137). While this is not to say SADC is totally pointless in the security realm, however when one interrogates SADC's role as a mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis there are few success stories and far more procrastinations and unfulfilled commitments and empty promises. It remains the case that SADC does not have any regional mediation architecture to address security problems. As noted by Taylor (2014:137) this is not a question of capacity, but is about a lack of political will at the highest level. He further argues that the issue of agency and leadership is at the heart of policy decisions that may lead to a nascent security community. It can thus be argued that SADC is far from evolving into a nascent security community. While it is true that regional leaders rhetorically promote regionalism in
forums such as SADC, it is a regionalism that their own practices also undermine and subvert.

The SADC Guidelines on democratic elections, adopted by the Summit in 2004 are a manifestation of the gap between the official discourse and reality. For example the new electoral laws signed by the President of Zimbabwe in 2005 were patently inadequate, as they failed to ensure a level playing field and guarantee the rights and freedoms required for legitimate elections (Nathan, 2013:206). As Nathan puts it, the most significant negative dynamic has been SADC’s failure to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices. This failure has often been characterised by passivity, turning a blind eye (quiet diplomacy) to authoritarianism and repression in the region, especially in the case of Zimbabwe. By so doing the rule of law, the protection of the region’s inhabitants and the status and credibility of SADC’s legal instruments were undermined (Nathan, 2013:206).

Apart from the Zimbabwe crisis, the lethargic actions of SADC are discernible in the 14 nation bloc’s history. Although parliamentary elections and open pluralism are a feature of democratic change in the region, there was political turmoil and mounting threats to peace and security, exemplified by the violent change of government in Madagascar, the post-election conflicts in Lesotho, the reluctance of the political elite to open up political space for competition in Swaziland, the seemingly intractable political and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe, as well as fragility of the peace accord in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Thus in line with the weak state theory the majority of SADC countries remain threatened by vulnerabilities stemming from unconsolidated democracies, institutional weaknesses and threats from within. SADC’s weaknesses can be largely ascribed to the fact that democratic values, such as human rights, freedom of the media and free political competition are not shared or internalised within member states. This stems in large part from SADC’s diversity and the fact that it has always had non-democratic or semi-democratic states.

The Constitutional crisis in Swaziland, internal and external threats against the DRC, the legacy of war in Angola and political, economic and institutional fragility in Zimbabwe highlight OPDS weaknesses to resolve SADC internal problems. There is however strong theoretical evidence to suggest that shared values of democracy underpins relative success of regional security organisations. Regional integration and security architectures for a security community require political stability and effective
conflict resolution mechanisms. Leadership in Southern Africa therefore need to assume
more responsibility for reversing negative trends and creating regional ‘public goods’,
through the OPDS and as such common regional positions are critically important.
Whatever the intentions of SADC leaders, the grouping lacks mechanisms to enforce its
principles if they are violated. On the whole, SADC does not publicly engage with the
‘internal affairs’ of neighbours, even when evident violations of SADC principles regarding
human rights and democracy have taken place. While the principles of non-interference
and sovereign equality maybe stabilising factors, they also have negative consequences
for the evolution of regional organisations.

SADC’s efforts to create a regional security regime have been constrained and
undermined by the weakness of member states, their fear of diluting sovereignty and
most importantly, their lack of shared values as enshrined in the SADC Treaty. These
interlinked and deep rooted political and structural dynamics prevent effective
peacemaking and impair the functionality of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and
organisation, especially in the sensitive domain of security. External logic refers to the
advancement of state interests, in the absence of which states have little incentive to
engage in co-operation and limit their discretionary decision-making. On the other hand
internal logic refers to common values, in the absence of which states cannot achieve
cohesion and adopt common policies and rules. If principles and norms provide the basic
defining characteristic of a regional integration regime, it then follows that states that
cannot reach agreement on core principles and norms are unable to establish an
effective security community.

There is a paradigm shift towards new ways of understanding ‘security’. Less emphasis
and obsession is being placed on sovereignty and secure borders. The safety of
individuals as well as the well-being of communities is now viewed as paramount
(Ferreira and Henk, 2009:501). Traditional models of security are to a large extent viewed
as defective since they fail or neglect to stress the well-being of people. This view is
consistent with the United Nations, which envisions that security should be ‘people-
centred’ rather than state-centred. In contrast the processes giving rise to security in
SADC are largely state-initiated and state-driven. SADC countries vary markedly in terms
of resource, geographic, demographic, economic and security factors, giving rise to
varying interests. Disputes in operationalisation of the organ are thus normative, and
relate to the political, strategic culture and entrenched interests of states such as Zimbabwe. While SADC states agree that a mechanism for peace and security cooperation would serve their interests, they disagree markedly and profoundly on the orientation and methods of that mechanism. At the heart of the organ’s difficulties lie a systematic tension between regional goals and national interests. The overarching dilemma facing Southern African regional integration and the OPDS is that while the SADC treaty endeavours to strengthen states in various ways, institutional structures are in various ways too weak and incapable of undertaking this endeavour successfully.

Intergovernmental bargaining can alternatively be embedded in processes that are provoked and sustained by supranational rules. At the legal-normative level rules stabilise state interstate bargaining, delegitimise exit and lay down binding standards of conduct enforceable legally. It can thus be deduced that to enforce its principles and values, SADC needs to further produce and transmit rules that guide social interaction and regional integration. Such rules should serve to structure access to policy processes, and to promote the public interest. Since rules are central to institutionalisation, the SADC organ should be a crucial starting point for subsequent integration. Rules and rule-making should be at the helm of regional integration.

Rules define roles and establish social contexts in which actors’ interests and strategies take shape. While actors may act in self-interested ways; both their interests and behaviours should take form in a social setting defined by the rule of law. Where norms and values may not provide clear guidelines for dispute resolution processes, new binding rules can be created, reinterpreted and modified. This helps create what Sweet and Sandholtz, (1998:299) refer to as the ‘loop’ of institutionalisation. Similarly, Nathan (2013:206) has attributed SADC’s poor record of peacekeeping and peace-building to three major problems: an absence of common values among member states, which militates against effective responses to crises and the development of mutual trust and common policies, the reluctance of member states to surrender a degree of sovereignty to multinational bodies, which is a *sine qua non* of regional integration; and the economic and administrative weakness of states, which affects all SADC’s forums and programmes. Nathan (2013:206) thus argues that the absence of common values, fear of losing sovereignty, and weak states tend to weaken SADC’s efforts in pursuit of an effective security community. He further asserts that contrasting visions of leadership and chasms in the definition of what it would mean to strengthen SADC as a vehicle for
security collaboration and integration have fatally undermined the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) that was created in 1996.

As Nathan (2013:197) sees it, the wide variances in the political landscape of SADC member states, where we have democratic regimes (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles) and authoritarian regimes (Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe), demonstrates a lack of shared values and this undermines a collective sense of purpose and cohesiveness in SADC. This is more so, as in Raftopoulos (2010:707) the GPA can be understood as a major aspect of the “passive revolution” in which in the case of Zimbabwe, a ruling party facing an organic political and economic crisis uses the space to reconfigure and renegotiate the terms of its existence with the opposition, civil society and the international community. Due to such deep-rooted problems which are structural Nathan (2013:206) postulates that they will not be overcome quickly or easily and thus SADC’s future is mostly likely to be very similar to its past.

The SADC organ’s ability to strengthen weak states and contribute to the democratic transformation of authoritarian states is severely constrained because its capacity, orientation and mandate derive from these states. The SADC organ cannot drive member countries’ transformation or attend to their domestic security problems, because it is a forum of states that will not permit it to do this. Arguably, SADC can neither forge a genuine consensus on regional security and democratic governance, since major disputes relate to the primary political features as practised within member states and are not susceptible to negotiation and compromise. Within this reality, the attainment of an effectively functioning security community in southern Africa becomes more problematic and remains a regional challenge. To achieve progress in regionalism Southern African countries will have to tackle one of the most important prerequisites for viable interstate cooperation, transparent and legitimate political rule.

Domestic instability in the form of large-scale violence precludes the emergence of a security community. Reports of rampant lawlessness, “state sponsored” violence and suspect electoral processes in member states such as Zimbabwe are extremely worrying. They generate tension and suspicion, and prevent the forging of trust and common identity. In national contexts, instability seriously undermines the security of citizens and the state. The inhabitants of a country wracked by violence cannot plausibly be said to live in security community. A security community should thus be defined to include dependable expectations of peaceful domestic change. On this basis structural instability
and authoritarian rule are obstacles to the formation of security communities in the Southern African region. Regional organisations like SADC which include unstable countries will in spite of instruments such as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation not progress to the status of mature security communities, if they focus exclusively on interstate relations and rigidly adhere to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.

SADC may engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building, with varying degrees of success, but its ability to strengthen weak states and transform authoritarian ones is severely constrained. Weak states unavoidably establish weak organisations, autocratic regimes set up multilateral forums that tolerate authoritarianism, and insecure governments loath regional integration with supranational authority. While attempts have been made to promote regional integration in other spheres of regional co-operation, the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is bedevilled by challenges. A move towards strong value consensus can more effectively bring about the establishment of a mature security community for regional stability, peace and security within the SADC regional grouping.

**Conclusion**

The SADC mediation in Zimbabwe provides a litmus test for the regional body’s capacity to resolve conflicts using mediation as a constructive and non-violent tool. SADC embodies a crucial attempt by the southern African region to take advantage and protect mutual interests and objectives as provided for in Articles, of the regional body. The SADC treaty and Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation Articles and provisions offer unforeseen opportunities to signatories of the regional body. Peace, security, human rights, democracy and rule of law are core values it espouses. The Zimbabwe case provides lessons that could inform future mediation. The robust and consistent communiqués that have emerged from SADC since the March 2011 Troika Summit of the SADC OPDSC in Livingstone, Zambia have to some extent demonstrated a SADC resolve to the Zimbabwe crisis. SADC can also be commended for the progress made in the daunting task of normalising the Zimbabwe situation, especially during the “power sharing” government under the GPA. The “dollarisation” of the currency for example, has had salutary effects on the economy; even though demand remained suppressed, some normalcy returned. However, the lethargic implementation of the SADC
mediated Global Political Agreement (GPA) generated widespread criticism of SADC for feebly mediating the agreement which they so painstakingly helped to negotiate. When there are no obligations to adhere to SADC principles and values, when they do not suit the interests of the ruling elites, it becomes difficult to hold member states accountable for their actions and inactions. The Zimbabwe case study seems to suggest that SADC as an enforcement power and guarantor of the Zimbabwe GPA either lacked both power and authority or had been reluctant to hold the contending parties and the Zimbabwe government accountable. Regrettably, it allows itself to be utterly inadequate to the task of maintaining stable political environments, defending citizens of member states from authoritarian state power and promoting peace and security.

This had the effect of exposing SADC as a weak regional body. SADC’s reputation, credibility and moral authority depends on its ability to hold member states accountable, otherwise, it will remain weak, and the problematic member states will take advantage of its weakness to sway it from its principled decisions. A structural flaw and gaping hole in SADC has also been the lack of a standing regional mediation architecture, which has only recently become the focus of remedial action. It is this article’s contention that SADC should take decisive steps and re-establish itself as a credible and serious body capable of creating a security community that is progressive. A discussion and debate is thus critically important and imperative, especially around the notion of building a security community and on how best to socialize member states to overcome their differences in order to facilitate their recognition of core common values.
### List of References


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