Techno-Bureaucratic Governance and Public Service Delivery:
Indonesia and Nigeria in Perspectives

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Abstract

Techno-bureaucratic governance is fundamental to contemporary public service. This is because the roles of the bureaucrats and technocrats become more relevant in policy formulation and implementation when the government had to (re)invent its institutions to move from routine administration to that of development planning and management. Utilizing a qualitative approach, the paper notes that techno-bureaucratic ideology values technical expertise itself and its technical experts, efficiency, economic development and effective public service delivery. Adopting comparative perspective, the paper examines techno-bureaucratic governance and public service delivery in Indonesia and Nigeria. The paper takes a cursory look at the similarities and differences between the two countries. The paper notes that the technocracy nurtured by the New Order in Indonesia was cohesive and effective because of its technical expertise and has helped Indonesia to turn oil income into productive investments, whereas in Nigeria the oil income was used for prestigious projects to the detriment of productive investments. The paper therefore recommend among others that developing societies need a new strategy in delivery services in their public service, and this can be achieved through skilled professionals, technocrats and knowledge based actors. It concludes that for public service to deliver effective services, an efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain invaluable.

Keywords: Techno-bureaucratic governance, Service Delivery, Productive Investment, Development Planning, Public Policy.

Introduction

Over the last fifty years, a new class has made its appearance on the stage of history. This class may be called the new middle-class, salaried middle-class, bureaucratic class, techno-bureaucratic class or just techno-bureaucracy. It originally emerged in capitalist countries, but rose to political power in the Soviet Union and later in countries under communist parties' rule. In developing countries, this new class grew in power and influence by asserting its control over the armed forces and the state apparatus. The importance of this "new middle-class" is fundamental to contemporary techno-bureaucratic governance, so that it becomes extremely difficult to do any economic or political analysis without considering the role of this class (Bresser-Pereira, 2004:162).

Techno-bureaucratism represents the crystallization of rationalistic ideas and actions which define the modern world. It is the sum total of the whole technological, economic and social revolution which has been taking place throughout the world (Amir, 2008:316). Techno-bureaucratic ideology values technical expertise itself and its technical experts, efficiency, economic development and the resultant mass consumption. Techno-bureaucratic ideology places its belief in planning and rational management. Thus, techno-bureaucratic ideology gains perfect internal logic and becomes a powerful instrument for the seizing of power by the techno-bureaucracy. Also, techno-bureaucratic ideology belief that all problems are technical problems and can be technically solved. This belief is based on the typically techno-bureaucratic world view which presupposes an inherent internal logic that exists in things and situations in an essentially harmonious world. For the techno-bureaucrats, the world is a system or complex of systems in which each element has its place and its role (Bresser-Pereira, 2004:197). As a result, techno-bureaucrats have attained some degree of success in their attempts to be viewed as neutral, as well as in their efforts to show that ideology has come to an end is the fact that techno-bureaucratic ideology is extraordinarily widespread.

This paper takes a cursory look at techno-bureaucratic governance and public service delivery in developing societies. It therefore focuses on Indonesia and Nigeria. This is due to the fact that scholars, mostly in the field of economic development, became interested in a comparative study of Indonesia and Nigeria only recently. It began in the late 1980s, particularly among the economists who were working at the World Bank which looked at the development processes across the globe. This is because Indonesia

and Nigeria show similar features in terms of geographic and demographic size, political development and ethnic diversity. Also, the two countries faced relatively similar economic conditions in the late sixties, but within two decades showed a different path in their public sector performances. By comparing Indonesia and Nigeria, the paper establishes how the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance become necessary in the emergence and sustenance of effective service delivery in the public sector.

Statement of the Problem

Over the years, the public services at federal and state levels lost the value on which they were established. Merit is sacrificed for expediency and opportunism. From a more historical perspective, the Nigerian bureaucracy just like its counterpart in most of the post-colonial states was a colonial creation, which was not in any way directed toward any developmental agenda. It was purely established for the exploitation of these colonies with the mandate of maintaining law and order. It was post-independence developmental challenges of the country that gave the bureaucracy more roles other than its initial roles for which it was created (Fajonyomi, 1998:22). The abandonment of the guideline for recruitment into public service inadvertently opens the gate of entry into the service for incompetent persons. This to a large extent affects the performance of the Nigerian bureaucracy in the area of policy articulation, implementation and evaluation (Adeyemo & Osunyikanmi, 2009:2).

One of the basic characteristics of the Weberian ideal/legal rational bureaucracy is that bureaucrats should be politically neutral. That is, bureaucrats are not expected to be involved in the process of policy making, but rather they are only expected to implement policies made by the executive arm of government. What this suggests is that the elected political executives or appointed cabinet ministers are expected to make laws, while the bureaucrats take order from the executive for the implementation of the policies formulated. The top bureaucrats could at best play advisory roles to the politicians in the process of policy making. Going by this Weberian's principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats, it is only technocrats who are appointed by the executive head of government as cabinet ministers that can play any major role in the process of policy formulation (Thovoethin, 2014:17). This has serious effect for effective public service delivery. Amuwo (2008:56) regards these type of technocracy and bureaucracy as critical

elements of state capacity when he opines that "an efficient, capable, disciplined, professional, skilled, and relatively autonomous bureaucracy, driven by a nationalistic political elite that privileges economic development."

The civil service in developing societies has been described as corrupt, inefficient and a big drain on the economy. This has been a major concern to scholar, policy makers and social commentators as well. Despite all measures put in place to arrest the performance failure, the service, it seems, has defied all approaches towards tackling the problem of inefficiency and capacity collapse. Corruption or "black market" bureaucracy continues to flourish and other counter-productive attitudes also continue to flourish. As a result, the performance of public bureaucrats tends to be sluggish, their coffee breaks prolonged, and their need for supervision constant. Available evidence shows that the performance of the public service in virtually all tiers of government and in extra-ministerial departments in developing societies has remained very abysmal, hence the present state of underdevelopment (Obasi, 1987:15, Jike, 2003:21, Adebayo, 2001:45 & Okafor, 2005:7). The civil service has virtually lost its ethos of anonymity, neutrality and security in tenure, an institution in which moral has reached its nadir, in which excessive caution, undue bureaucratic practice and interminable delays have become the hallmarks. The institution is seemingly resistant to dynamic change, and has become the object of constant public criticisms. The present state of affairs in the civil service appears that the variables responsible for poor performance in developing societies have not been dealt with and so the problem still lingers. This is in agreement with the view of Akhakpe (2014:19) that one of the concern with public service delivery in Nigeria since the achievement of statehood is that of efficient use of public resources to maximize public goods. What is striking is that service-delivery outcomes have remained disappointing or uneven in countries with relatively high economic growth rates, increased financial flows and improved technical and administrative capacity. Nigeria, for example, has emerged as one of the world's most rapidly growing economies, making the transition from low-income to middle-income status.

The gap in knowledge that this paper attempts to fill is that existing literatures shows more concern for the application and evaluation of bureaucracy in the public sector. Though, a large body of study exists on bureaucracy and technocracy as a separate concept. It is important to note that the bulk of these studies focus majorly on the

merits and the dark side of bureaucracy. This is in line with the observation of Fajonyomi (2012:142) in his critical analysis of public administration and national development that:

> *Despite the involvement of bureaucracy in more technical services, there was no time anybody has any serious thought of restructuring the bureaucracy to reengineering its fundamental principles and philosophy which were essentially developed for law and order functions. In essence, old attitudes continued to be used in tackling modern situations.*

Little attempt has been made to link bureaucracy with technocracy in order to improve service delivery in the public sector. Also, few attempts have been made to examine techno-bureaucratic governance and public service delivery across continent. In order to fill this gap, this paper therefore tries to examine techno-bureaucratic governance and public service delivery in Asia and Africa, using Indonesia and Nigeria as a point of reference. Thus, it is going to add to existing body of literature and extend the frontiers of knowledge in public administration.

Methodology

The data for this paper were drawn mainly from secondary sources. In-depth literature studies were conducted to have a fundamental understanding of the issues raised in the paper. It is a theoretical examination of techno-bureaucratic governance and public service delivery in Indonesia and Nigeria.

Conceptual Issues

Within the disciplinary parameters of social science, the issue of definition of concepts has not been problem free. This has been largely due to the eclectic nature and paradigmatic dispositions of respective disciplines within the field. Given this, there is a need for caution on the part of any scholars in giving precise meaning to concepts in the social sciences, particularly when such meanings could not have been unconnected with the perspective, ideological persuasion or the unit of analysis of such scholar (Oluwatobi, 2012:184; Akindele; Adeyemo, & Olaopa, 1997:1). Therefore, for more classification and their usage in this paper, it is appropriate to conceptualise technocracy, technocrat, techno-bureaucracy, bureaucracy, governance and public service delivery.

Technocracy, Technocrat and Techno-bureaucracy: Understanding the phenomena

The term "Technocracy" was first coined in 1919 by William Henry Smyth, an American engineer, and was broadly used in the 70s when technocracy appeared to be a feasible future form of government (Lindstam, 2014:5). Smyth's usage referred purely to Industrial democracy, in which he sought to demonstrate the integration of 'workers into decision making through existing firms or revolution'. Later the term came to mean government by specialized decision making.

The term *technocracy* derives from the Greek words *"tekhne"* meaning *skill* and *kratos* meaning *power,* as in government, or rule. Technocracy is a state of techno-bureaucratic control and regulatory enforcement that does not provide deliberative space to civic actors to enact change, learning and modification (Fischer, 2003:3). In the words of Roszak (l969:5), technocracy mean that social form in which an industrial society reaches the peak of its organizational integration. This is what the ideal men usually have in mind when they speak of modernizing, up-dating, rationalizing and planning.

Technocracy means governance by experts. This model wants to make politics more rational and efficient. It takes into account that the growth of scientific knowledge and technological inventions is faster than the process of political decision-making and that the politicians cannot understand all these complex issues (Fischer, 2008:4). It is a form of government where decision-makers are chosen for a governing office based on their technical expertise and background. Fischer (1990:21) refers to technocracy as a 'quiet revolution' which ultimately has transformed the way we think about and understand politics; it is a meta-phenomenon geared more to the shape of governance than the content per se.

In his view, Meynaud (1969:31) gave a classical definition of technocracy as a system of governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized knowledge and position in dominant political and economic institutions. Technocracy irreducibly displays the following features:

- Laws and regulations are designed to pay attention to performance and efficiency, not individuals.

- Laws are enforced by designing a system such that it is impossible to break them.

- The various 'branches of the government work together and share knowledge to maximize the performance of each branch in as equal a way as is feasible'.

- Only experts occupy positions where crucial decisions are to be made in the bureaucracy, so that, for a few instances, the economy is regulated by economists; social policy is designed by political scientists; the healthcare system is run by medical professionals (Hubbert, 1974:4; Howard, 2005:18).

The above framework as observed by Owakah and Aswani (2009:89) may seem authoritarian, but the principles of a technocracy should be anticipatory – designed as a form of *in-built problem-solving,* in which action is based on the psychology of conditioning, rather than on the intrusive whims of personality.

Technocrat is one who exercises authority by virtue of his technical competence. In the post-industrial society, technical skills become the base and mode of access to power. Skills and expertise have often been considered the main characteristics shared by individuals with a technocratic mind-set (Bell, 1973:348). As noted by Putnam (1977:386-387), technocratic mentality is primarily composed of six elements.

- First, a technocrat believes that "technics must replace politics and defines his own role in apolitical terms."

- Second, "the technocrat is sceptical and even hostile toward politicians and political institutions."

- Third, "the technocrat is fundamentally unsympathetic to the openness and equality of political democracy."

- Fourth, "the technocrat believes that social and political conflict is, at best, misguided, and, at worst, contrived."

- Fifth, "the technocrat rejects ideological or moralistic criteria, preferring to debate policy in practical, 'pragmatic' terms when analysing public issues."

- Sixth, "the technocrat is strongly committed to technological progress and material productivity; he is less concerned about distributive questions of social justice."

Techno-bureaucracy therefore can be viewed as a more modern or more technical form of the bureaucracy. Its authority is also rational-legal but its juridical *legitimation* gives way to technical *legitimation.* The efficiency of the organization is considered the most important goal. Technical competence is no longer acknowledged by means of entrance examinations and diplomas, as in Weber's model, but rather depends upon the effective performance of the techno-bureaucrat. The techno-bureaucracy constitutes a social class to the extent to which it takes on all the specific characteristics of this social category in the twentieth century (Bresser-Pereira, 2004:127).

Techno-bureaucratism basically signifies the transfer of power from the bourgeoisie to the techno-bureaucratic class, which also assumes the social role of ruling class. The change of ruling class is not an isolated super-structural phenomenon, but the outcome of deep transformations in the relations of production within society which distinguish the new mode of production from capitalism as well as from socialism. Techno-bureaucratic organization is necessarily efficient. There is always an assumption concerning the techno-bureaucrats'/techno-bureaucracy's efficiency and technical competence, but this is often merely a legitimation for power, not necessarily based on reality. While bureaucracy is a mere status group at the service of the dominant class, techno-bureaucracy assumes the character of a social class, working in association with the bourgeoisie in techno-bureaucratic capitalism, and becoming dominant in statism (Bresser-Pereira, 2004:115).

The Concept of Bureaucracy

As a concept in politico-administrative studies, bureaucracy has attracted definitions of various scholars. Therefore, there is no unanimous agreement between these scholars on the definition of bureaucracy. In the literatures on public administration, the term bureaucracy is used as a synonym of public administration. This is the usage to be adopted in the paper and the focus is on governmental bureaucracy/administration. The other concepts that are more or less synonymous of governmental bureaucracy/administration are civil service and public service (Eme & Onwuka, 2010:38).

The word bureaucracy was derived from the French word *bureau* – office and the Greek word *kratos* – strength, power, dominion, sovereignty, rule, mastery (Olaopa, 2008:18). It came into usage in the 18th century, and it referred explicitly to political system dominated by public official. It is used in connection with the conduct of public

officials. Bureaucracy came to refer to a class rather than a system dominated by that class. Bureaucracy basically is a characteristic feature of large and complex organizations as opposed to a one-man concern. This accounts for why bureaucracy is viewed as the connecting link between the mandators of the organization and the workers (Sharma, 1982 cited in Tonwe, 2008:208).

Bureaucracy according to Eme and Onwuka (2010:38) can be viewed as a large-scale, complex, hierarchical and specialized organization designed to attain rational objectives in the most efficient and effective manner. The realization of such rational goals and objectives are maximized through the bureaucratic qualities of formalism and impersonality in the application of rules and regulations in the operation and management of organizations. Even though Max Werber is described as the father of bureaucracy, the practice of bureaucracy is as old as the world itself. Every society has experienced it. Bureaucracy is a type of formal administration with the characteristics of division of labour, rules and regulation, hierarchy of authority, impersonality of social relationships and technical competence, *etc.* The essence of bureaucracy is to enable large organisations to be managed, to achieve efficiency and be more accountable to the people. In other words, bureaucracy is the coordination of organisational activities for effective, efficient and economical provision of services by public and private organisations.

As stated by Akhakpe (2014:18), bureaucracy is the engine room of the system of public administration. He noted further that by virtues of their profession, bureaucrats possess certain characteristics which can be used to bring about positive or negative changes. The unique attitudes of bureaucrats should be seen as the outcome of long term experience and tradition created by being used to particular tasks and challenges and influenced probably by the personality of the heads in the public sector organisations.

The classical bureaucracy of Weber is seen as a very superior organization mainly because of certain qualities such as hierarchy, division of labour anchored on specialization, policy of promotion and recruitment based on merit, in addition to impersonality in the conduct of official duties, security of tenure and strict observance of rules and regulations, among others (Weber, 1964 cited in Eme & Onwuka, 2010:38). Thus the ideal type of bureaucracy, so brilliantly developed by Max Weber (1922), is becoming the dominant system at all levels of social life. But today, bureaucracy is so

often used as a derogatory term, that one forgets that it "was coined by a distinguished sociologist to describe an institutional development that he regarded to be of great benefit to modern society.

Governance

Over the last decade, the term 'governance' has become so widely quoted by academicians, and so quickly accepted by practitioners, that it has acquired and enjoyed a leading status in the usage of terminologies in public administration research and practice, and even substitutes for the term 'public administration' or 'government' in many instances (Hwang, 2011:3).

Governance first made its appearance in development circles in a much quoted paragraph on the World Bank's 1989 report titled, "Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth." The etymological roots of the term "governance" has roots in the classical Latin word *"gubernare"* meaning "steering of boats" and originally referred mainly to the action or manner of governing, guiding, or steering conduct. Although considered by some to be synonymous with government, governance is generally understood to be a broader term, directing attention to the distribution of power both internal and external to the state (Stoker, 1998:192). In the words of Taylor (2002:82), whilst governance occurs without government, government cannot happen without governance. Like other currently fashionable terms, such as globalization, governance means many different things to many different people.

The term 'governance' has risen to prominence in the last thirty (30) years as a way of describing and explaining changes in our world. It has become a prominent topic across the social sciences, and a major concern for political and non-profit actors. Typically, governance refers to changes in the nature and role of the state since the last quarter of the twentieth century. The World Bank (1989:10) defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources. The term "governance" according to Marsden and Murdoch (1998:1) refers to:

> *something of a transformation in patterns and processes of governing: according to one analyst of this transformation "governance signifies a change in the meaning (of) government, referring to a new process of*

governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed". . . At root, this shift is considered to be evident in the institutions and institutional relations which now formulate, implement and coordinate policy.

In the view of Ninalowo (2005:29), governance is the totality of executive or administrative functions of the state, with a view to fulfilling the terms of social contract or constitutional obligations to the citizenry. Yaqub and Abubakar (2005:31) defined governance as the totality of the process of constituting a government as well as administering a political community. Governance refers broadly to the exercise of power through a country's economic, social, and political institutions in which institutions represent the organizational rules and routines, formal laws, and informal norms that together shape the incentives of public policy-makers, overseers, and providers of public services (UNDP, 2007:18). It is the process of exercising political, economic and administrative authority, especially over a state. Embodied in governance are also mechanisms, processes and institutions put in place through which citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (Okeke, 2010:15). In general, governance refers to changes in the role, structure and operation process of the government, or the way social problems are resolved (Heinrich & Lynn, 2000:12). Despite the strong intuitive appeal, governance has not been defined clearly.

From the above, we can conclude that governance is the process of decisions making and the process by which decisions are executed or implemented. Therefore, governance is the sum total of ways by which the general affairs of the commonwealth is managed in the interest of all.

Public Service Delivery

In the context of governance, public service delivery is the result of the intentions, decision of government and government institutions, and the actions undertaken and decision made by people employed in government institutions (Rakate, 2006:14). According to Oronsaye (2010:31), service delivery is the process of meeting the needs of citizens through prompt and efficient procedures. It presupposes that the interaction between citizens and government results in value creation. Carlson (2005:41) conceptualised service delivery as the relationship between policy makers, service

providers and poor people. According to them, it encompasses services and their supporting systems that are typically regarded as a state responsibility. These include social services (primary education and basic health services), infrastructure (water, sanitation, roads and bridges) and services that promote personal security (justice, police, *etc)*.

Public service delivery is also commonly understood to mean the provision of public goods or social (education, health), economic (grants) or infrastructural (water, electricity) services to those who need (or demand) them.

Theoretical Framework

The analytical perspective of the public choice theory is useful in this discourse. The theory began as a critique of the increasing politicisation of the apparatuses of government and the self serving tendencies of bureaucracies in modern State (Parson, 1999:2). A close look at the ingredients of this theory reveals its intricate link with those basic economic principles that motivate men in society. It testifies to the claim that politicians and bureaucrats often do not act altruistically.

Public choice theory is deduced from the concept of rational choice, which applies the principles of neo-classical economics to political behaviour (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003:89). The core idea is that people treat political choices much the same as economic choices by acting in a way to maximize their own self interest. The theory presumes "methodological individualism," which assumes that actors operate on the basis of self-interest, with rationality (valuation of preferences, complete information about alternatives and consequences), compliance with basic law and order, and adopt utility maximizing strategies (Ostrom, 1974:78).

Niskanen (1971:31) was the first public choice theorist to model the behaviour of bureaucracies. His theory rests on the following assumptions. First, the bureau has a virtual monopoly on true supply cost information. Second, the bureau knows the legislature's demand for the bureau's services. These assumptions allow agencies to make all-or-nothing offers (concerning both the budget and output) to the legislature. Consequently, the budget of a bureau would always be above the point where marginal public benefits (from the activities performed by the bureau) equal marginal costs. In other words, it is assumed that the bureau's principal objective is to secure an ever-

larger budget. At the same time, the agency is determined to produce an output above the social optimal level.

Public choice theory is applicable to service delivery in the public sector, because the bureaucrats and the technocrats should deliver services needed by the people. It is in this context, that Takaya (1989:10) viewed the role of the Nigerian higher civil service in ensuring the continuity and unity of Nigeria as an indivisible sovereign entity during the civil war, as being dictated more by self interest than by patriotism. While the theory of incrementalism considered policy making by bounded-rational legislators and administrators in governments, the theory of public choice considers policy-making by citizens, rather than by governmental policy actors.

A Brief Overview of Indonesian Civil Service

The Republic of Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world with a population of over 231 million people. It is an extremely socially and culturally varied nation. There are more than 300 ethnic groups, each with its own language, customs, and form of social organization (Lewis, 2012:2).

Indonesia's civil service consists of some 4.6 million people. Of this, about 500,000 are police and military, leaving some 4 million civilian civil service. The Indonesian civil bureaucracy underwent numerous changes in the 1974–84 period, which reflect both regime policies and broader societal and political changes. Recent social and political changes have had profound impacts on Indonesia society. These, among others, include: democratization, decentralization or regional autonomy, transparency, and openness of information against the backdrop of globalization. In order to adapt to the situation, the Indonesian government started straightening up the bureaucracy, an exercise that involved changes in structure and systems that would result in a modern and efficient bureaucracy (Tjiptoherijanto, 2015:19). Although civil servants in Indonesia comprise only around 1.7–1.8 percent of the total population, the quality of the government employees is considered rather low. In many Asian countries, public administration is in the process of considerable change and reform. Citizens in these countries, as well as in Indonesia, have demanded faster, better, and cheaper public service. They have also demanded for more effective and efficient government. In order to meet these demands, the nation has to change its public management into more democratic, efficient, and citizen-oriented governance.

Historically, the size of bureaucracy in Indonesia has increased since the end of Dutch colonization. Following independence, 390,000 civil servants were employed under the Old Order regime. The number significantly increased to more than 2 million after the oil boom under Suharto's regime and further expanded gradually after the transition to democracy in 1998 (Tjiptoherijanto, 2015:22). In the early sixties Indonesia's bureaucracy is among the worst in terms of inefficient, and red tape, a constant blight to citizens and deterrent to foreign investment, so that bureaucracies may even become "power centres" in their own right, allowing them to effectively resist efforts toward reforms by politicians and appointed officials (France-Presse, 2010:5).

Indonesia is now growing rapidly to be an economic power in South-East Asia, through various agendas of reform programmes. Indonesia state administration improved after the amendment of 1945 Constitution, which is continuously changing in between years 1999 to 2002. The Indonesia reformation programme at the transition era is perceived to be able to perform the new state system in better condition. One of a good result now is Indonesia most likely known as a most democratic country in the world (Tjiptoherijanto, 2013:19).

Indonesian government has to improve the structure of its bureaucracy, both in terms of enhancing the quality of government employees and developing a modern and efficient system. The development of human resources would improve the quality of services provided to citizens. This task is currently especially significant in Indonesia as the country is confronting a variety of new developments, such as democratization and decentralization.

Nature and Character of Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Indonesia

Indonesia has undergone a successful transition from authoritarian rule to become one of the largest democracies in Asia and in the world. Since 1998, the government has introduced a range of economic and political reforms aimed at erasing the legacies of the old regime (Freedom House, 2011:2).

The practice of technocracy in Indonesia arose at the dawn of the New Order regime, emerging in the aftermath of the 1965-1966 political unrest, an uneasy period that opened a new chapter in the history of modern Indonesia. The Indonesian technocracy evolved under the New Order from 1966 to 1998 as a strategic component of its politics

of stability and economic development. Led by former Army General, President Suharto, the appearance of the New Order regime was marked by the growing influences of the technocrats who came to the fore as the primary actors in policy making. Technocrats were instrumental in persuading Suharto to adopt reform measures in the 1980s that imposed market discipline on the government's developmental policies. Indonesian technocrats as a group were effective because they were cohesive in their adherence to the three principles of balanced budget, open capital account, and pegged exchange rate system, and also because they enjoyed Suharto's confidence and could therefore function as his right arm in formulating and executing national development policies (Takashi, 2014:279). The emergence of these professional elites in the New Order was to respond to the social and economic predicaments in the post-Sukarno period (Amir, 2008:317). Suharto fashioned his New Order regime with the state as his power base and the army as its backbone. The regime was centralized, militarized, and authoritarian. Army officers dominated the military and occupied strategic positions in the civilian arm of the state as district chiefs, provincial governors, directors-general, and ministers in the name of dual functions (Takashi, 2014:256).

In the early years of the New Order, there were not very many Indonesians who had the technical expertise to formulate and manage economic policies and to communicate in the language of economics with their counterparts from other countries. During this period, Technocrats who were in charge of development, thrived in the state of political demobilization under the New Order. They started their technocratic career in the early days of the New Order as Suharto's economic advisers. They were young academics trained as economists at Indonesia's premier University, the University of Indonesia, and abroad who maintained their academic status as University of Indonesia Professors while joining the government as technocrats. Five of them emerged as key members of Suharto's economic team and founding fathers of the Indonesian technocracy: Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Emil Salim, Subroto, and Mohammad Sadli (Takashi, 2014:257). Suharto had the highest confidence in the technocrats' capacity in macroeconomic administration as well as in crisis management. The technocrats were instrumental in setting the principles that informed the macro-economic policy framework under Suharto: the balanced budget, the open capital account, and the pegged exchange rate system. The entry of technocrats into the Indonesian governmental structure was unprecedented. It shifted the nature and orientation of public policy making. This shift

was characterized by salient changes in formulation of policies; in that, the economists viewed the economy as a domain neutral from ideology and politics. Hence, economic policies, according to this view, should follow rational calculations (Nitisastro, 1983:10).

The roles of the bureaucrats and technocrats become more relevant in policy formulation and implementation. From the 1980s through the fall of Suharto in 1998, national policy making had been affected by the tough competition between Habibie's group and Nitisastro's group. Upholding different policy directions, both groups grew stronger within the regime's structure, yet they possessed different resources to put forth their development agendas. These resources encompass high level bureaucratic offices, a network of government officials, and an alliance with a prestigious university (Amir, 2008:319). This has helped to improve public service delivery.

Another interesting case from the Indonesian bureaucracy during the New Order is the way Suharto exerted his power to control all aspects of bureaucrats' lives through a mandatory social organization called *Korpri*. Through this organization, Suharto laid great stress on socializing people to follow his ideology by supporting his party, and taking the role of policy implementers at the grassroots level (Vatikiotis, 2004:109). Hayes and Harahap (2011:16) argue that Indonesian government bureaucracy following the transition to democracy has functioned like a neo-patrimonial bureaucracy. Corruption and other symptoms of weak institutions have hindered the accountability for resource distribution. This has affected effective public service delivery in Indonesia. Thus, decentralization is one important factor in explaining how the quality of bureaucracy affects the higher levels of inequality in post-Suharto era. The evidence from the case of Indonesia presented in this paper lends credence to the proposition that the quality of bureaucracy, characterized by impartiality and bureaucratic autonomy, is associated with the level of inequality.

An Overview of Bureaucracy and Technocracy in Nigeria

The Nigerian bureaucracy is a child of the British Colonial Public Service. It was purely established for the purpose of exploitation with the mandate of maintaining law and order. At its inception, the British civil service had two broad objectives namely, to maintain law and order which Adamolekun (2000:21) euphemistically captured as the concept of "night watchman." The other objective which Onimode (1983) in Ezeh (2008:318) referred to as revenue generation found expression in the utilization of the

public service and its personnel to exploit and expropriate local or indigenous natural and mineral resources to develop the metropole. Frank (1972:82) epitomized this metropole-hinterland relationship in his centre-periphery model of the dependency theory. It was post-independence developmental challenges of the country that gave the bureaucracy more roles other than its initial roles for which it was created (Fajonyomi, 1998:31). In other words, the present arrangement of ministries, departments and agencies of government derived largely from the British system of colonial administration.

Theoretically, the Nigeria's bureaucracy has been modelled along the Weberian's principle of political neutrality, but as Somolekae (1993:7) remarks neutrality and autonomy remain relative concepts in Nigeria. According to her, since independence, the official position of the government is that policy making is the function of the politicians while the bureaucrats should only be responsible for policy implementation. However, available evidences show that in practice the bureaucrats and not the political leadership have dominated policy making in the country. It is however pertinent to point out that the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance at the central level depict what is obtainable at the different states of the federation (Thovoethin, 2014:18).

Nigerian Bureaucracy acts as agent of development. In fact, it is almost the most important institution of Nigerian State affecting the life of citizens daily. It is essential to modern life because of the roles it plays. Therefore, the quality of the civil service is important to the quality of modern life. The Nigerian civil service has undergone various changes since the amalgamation of the socio-political development in Nigeria, which has over the years had some major and tremendous effects on the civil service. Such developments include State creation, the civil war, the Military regimes, Political instability, ethnicity, Federal Character and so on (Omotoso, 2001:31). This is predicated on its potentials at marshalling human and materials resources required for economic growth and development. The role of public service in collecting data; disseminating information and ideas; analyzing data for policy decisions; weighing alternatives (including costs and benefits) and proffering possible courses of action are essentially noteworthy in this regard.

It has become the usual practice for different civilian governments in Nigeria to appoint some technocrats to embark on reforms in the financial sector, judicial sector, and public sector, among others (Mustapha, 2006:49). It is however instructive to note

that the various administrations from 1999 to 2013 have witnessed economic team and cabinet instability occasioned by regular change of members of the team and ministers.

In Nigeria, as in other developing countries, governments are carrying the bulk of the burden of economic development. The state, being the biggest employer of labour as a result of lack of a well-developed private sector, has thus become one huge instrument for stemming unemployment and other socio-economic miseries. Developing countries depend on big governments for their development because of their peculiar circumstances (Ola, 1990:24). With its huge size comes the array of problems affecting efficiency and effectiveness in the system. Nigerian bureaucracy has significant influence on the dysfunctionality public service. This dysfunctional characteristic of bureaucracy vis-à-vis implementation of innovative ideas clearly manifest in the Nigerian situation. As a result, the public service is characterised by a spirit of animosity and jealousy rather than of cooperation and team work. This spirit of animosity, it further observed, exists between peers as well as between superiors and subordinates (Maduabum, 2014:11). As argued by Ekpo (1979:3), Nigerian bureaucracies are corrupt, inefficient and overstaffed. Available evidence shows that the Performance of the public service in virtually all tiers of government and in extra-ministerial departments in Nigeria has remained very abysmal, hence the present state of underdevelopment. The abysmal performance of parastatals and agencies of government is very obvious in this regard. Nigerians are demanding more and better improved services and their demands are not being met, by all indications on the basis of the score cards of the civil service and the Parastatals (Okafor, 2005:4; Jike, 2003:6; Adebayo, 2001:15). In effect, this has slowed down the process of socio-economic and political development of Nigeria.

To ensure efficiency of Nigerian bureaucracy, several reforms took place immediately the service was emancipated from the tutelage of the British imperialists. Such reforms include: Jeromi Udoji Commission (1974), Babangida reform of 1988 and Abacha reform of 1997. In spite of these reforms, the public service is still characterized by high level of inefficiency (Anazodo, 2014:12). Several reforms have been carried out since after independence aimed at improving public service delivery. These reforms have not significantly improved the service offerings of the public service, due to its politicisation, lack of neutrality and poor human resources management practices (Inyang & Akaegbu, 2014:90). It is axiomatic from the above discourse that despite the conscious and deliberate efforts made to build the Nigerian public bureaucracy on the Weberian

principles, certain environmental and human factors conjoined to stifle optimal performance. This underscores the essence of several public/civil service reforms as highlighted in this paper. The Nigerian bureaucracy can become more efficient through continuous institutional overhaul and thorough attempts/search for efficiency via human capacity development based on the tenets of the Weberian model.

In Nigeria, it has become the usual practice for different civilian governments to appoint some technocrats to embark on reforms in the financial sector, judicial sector, and public sector, among others (Mustapha, 2006:10). It is, however, instructive to note that the various administrations from 1999 to 2013 have witnessed economic team and cabinet instability occasioned by regular change of members of the team and ministers. Few examples are sufficed to buttress this position. At the end of the first year of the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, one-third of the 30 ministers were either rotated or replaced (Thovoethin, 2014:29).

With regard to the role of technocracy, Olukoshi (2004:33) argued that the political effectiveness of the technocratic elite was, however, compromised by the fact that its leading lights were seen locally as being too closely tied to external interests at the same time as they were increasingly cut off from the rest of the local policy community either by commission or default. They were also ill-equipped to navigate the domestic political terrain, making it easy for them to be outmanoeuvred. When the crunch came, they were mostly unable to cope with or surmount the nationalist instinct in the bureaucracy and polity and were, therefore, readily sacrificed by the political leaders who appointed them or whose support they ultimately needed to remain effective.

Bangura (1994:31) has written on the constraints and opportunities in the formation of a Nigerian technocracy from a broader perspective. Bangura explored the dynamics that shaped the emergence of academics as a social force in Nigeria. He also elaborates on the complex process that facilitated their recruitment into the principal state institutions for managing the economic and political reforms. In Nigeria, according to Bangura (1994:27), a diffuse technocracy emerged in which academics played a leading role, but their effectiveness was hampered by the nature of the political reforms, which lacked sufficient institutionalization and enduring rules for political bargaining and the building of a stable coalition. Technocrats were exposed to too many changes in rules, personnel and policy and became active participants in the struggle for offices and

influence which ultimately concentrated power in the hands of the president and the military establishment.

Observations from Indonesia and Nigeria

Thorbecke (1998) cited in Takashi (2014:257) argued that looking at the similarity in its initial factors Indonesia in fact could easily have followed Nigeria's path. Yet Indonesia's performance was helped by some favourable conditions, particularly more consensual ethnic relationships, a unitary constitution and uninterrupted leadership. Indonesia turned oil income into productive investment through the efforts of technocrats, whereas Nigerian oil income was either siphoned abroad or used for prestige projects. The key for success for Indonesia was because Indonesia was capable to establish an environment conducive to growth in the non-oil economy with the involvement of technocrats, while Nigeria could not. Indonesia was also able to implement an economic liberalization policy which was in general sustained since 1967, whereas Nigeria delayed liberalization until 1986, and subsequently reversed it.

Another observation from the Indonesia experience is that institutions and policies sometimes have an expiration date. Without popular participation in decision making, the increasingly difficult choices a government must make may lack the legitimacy needed to make these decisions effective. Also, without efficient civil service, implementation of those policies and their effects may diverge strongly from what policymakers intended. Strong institutions are most needed when they matter most – in times of crisis. Indonesia's lack of well-functioning institutions aggravated the impact and duration of the crisis. If there is one final lesson that the Indonesian experience offers, it is that building and nurturing of strong public service is an integral part of development.

The comparison reveals that there were important differences between countries with regard to fiscal and exchange rate policies. The major differences also existed in their foreign borrowing strategies, which were more conservative in Indonesia; and agricultural policy, which was market-oriented and included provision of transitional assistance in Indonesia. Pinto's comparative study shows clearly the different outcomes of economic policies in Nigeria and Indonesia during and after the oil boom period.

The different path taking place in Indonesia and Nigeria perhaps most clearly shown by the existence of a group of technocrats that engaging economic development head on in a relatively a long period of time. The existence of such a group development

experts is vital to make a breakthrough as the country's institutional structure is generally weak due to the volatile bureaucratic politics and internal political rivalry. The emergence of a technocratic group that took the critical initiative in developing an economic strategy for solving their country's major development problems cannot be isolated from the nationalist projects that drive the country into independence. In such circumstances, a mere technocratic expertise is obviously not a sufficient ingredient for the emergence of development modernizers. A strong commitment to salvage the nation's problem, a kind of pragmatic nationalism, should be the important ingredient that could drive a technocratic group to take up their role in solving the national problem. Indeed it is a combination of technocratic know how and a strong sense of nationalism that only spring from deep ideological consciousness brought about by the country's national history. It is in this national and ideological context that Indonesia's technocratic group is different from Nigeria experience.

Concluding Remarks

Techno-bureaucratic ideology values technical expertise itself and its technical experts, efficiency, economic development and the resultant mass consumption. Techno-bureaucratic ideology places its belief in planning and rational management. More than anything else, it is the fruit of utilitarian economic rationalism. It values security, order and authority which are essential to efficiency.

In order for public service to deliver effective services, an efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain invaluable. Therefore, the technocrats and bureaucrats should be given prominent roles in the public service. No nation of the world has progressed and developed when insipid, stale and visionless minds inundate the entire system of governance. Not until the technocrats took over Brazil, Russia, India, China, Singapore and Malaysia that those countries witnessed growth and development. Just less than a decade ago, these countries were still called third world countries on same par with Nigeria. But today, they are flourishing with productive and educated workforce because of the policies and reforms executed by technocrats.

Technocrats, because of their training, are frequently accused of being less nationalistic than politicians. These assertions are based on the belief that recent economic changes – particularly privatization and reduced protectionism – are not only technocratic but also clearly antinationalistic. It is common for scholars to attribute these

economic changes to the rise to power of technocrats (Lindau, 1996:310-311). Generally speaking, technocrats are more interested in implementation of market reform rather than political reforms. Alfred (1978:57) points out that, technocratic elites often have chameleon-like qualities that allow them to serve various political masters. The technocrats are primarily concerned with promoting economic growth and to that end limiting the influence of ideology in policy making. In sum, the technocrats in Indonesia and Nigeria played an important role in economic transformations. It is important to note that technocrats' ideological and institutional connection with the state is an important explanatory variable in shaping their disposition of economics, in which the role of the state and public institutions largely define the type of economics.

In order to realise effective public service delivery and good governance in Indonesia and Nigeria, efforts to improve public services requires the presence of a watchdog state agency that is capable and effectively have the right base on law and regulation to assist people and community stand up from their weak positions when they are facing bureaucracy-maladministration.

Technocrats in Indonesia and Nigeria need a new strategy and ideas to re-configure the current socio-political and economic landscape of their countries. This is not about getting a large sum of money from a godfather sponsor to run for a political office. There is no new idea in that strategy. It is about using knowledge and modern thoughts that the old dogs lack to mesmerize them; thereby subtly and systemically wresting power out of them without gun shots. To save developing societies, the skilled professionals, technocrats, knowledge-based state actors with the "interest of their country at heart" would have to rise up and take over the affairs of the nation. The technocrat seeks to inform, assess and integrate the infrastructure in a merit-based management system. This is the future for developing societies.

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