The effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) depends on adequate funding. Literature has shown that successful ACAs all over the world are well funded, as well as enjoyed political will of their home governments.
The article examined the funding of the Nigerian anti-corruption agencies in relation to anti-corruption agencies in Hong Kong and Singapore.
The article is structured into eight sections namely the introduction, methodology, conceptual clarification, theoretical framework, funding patterns of anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, Singapore’s and Hong Kong agencies’ effectiveness in combating corruption, lessons from Singapore and Hong Kong as a basis for effective anti-corruption fighting in Nigeria and conclusion.
The article adopted the qualitative and quantitative methods. Data were collected from the primary and secondary sources. Two in-depth interview (IDI) sessions were held with officials of the agencies while documental analysis complemented the primary data in the study.
The study found that Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies are not adequately funded; and recommends that a significant percentage of the national budget should be earmarked for the ACAs. And, the successive should show the political will and commitment to fund ACAs.
It is an actuality that funding of the two ACAs in Nigeria has not been backed by a strong political will. However, the potentiality of the ACAs is still in its infancy. So far their performance has been insignificant and ineffective in combating corruption in Nigeria.
The detrimental effects of corruption on the economy of many countries in the past two decades could be seen in the global developmental landscape, and the rush to establish anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) had become a top policy priority around the world. This is based on the fact that governments see fighting corruption as a major policy for preventing their states from collapsing. Most observers agree that the global anti-corruption efforts have been appreciably successful, economically and socially, while some believe that the level of success in curbing corruption and preventing it from becoming lethargically endemic, has been below average (Brinkerhoff
In literature on anti-corruption, one of the identified factors that hindered some ACAs from fighting corruption effectively is underfunding. Although most countries of the world strive for qualitative ACAs with a real capacity to fight corruption, the problem of underfunding hinders this aspiration. At least, countries manage to balance between the worst and best case scenarios and the Nigerian ACAs are not isolated from this reality of a serious challenge.
Consequently, this paper explores the significance of increasing the funding of the two major ACAs (the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission [EFCC] and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission [ICPC]) in Nigeria with a view to learning from countries where ACAs had largely been successful. This is significant because learning from these models, characterised by best practices, has a way of helping the major ACAs in Nigeria in combating corruption.
In exploring the consequence of increasing funds available to the agencies, the paper seeks answers to the following questions: What is the pattern or nature of funding allocated to these agencies in combating corruption? What models of funding and practice of anti-corruption are available from other countries? What lessons can be learnt from foreign anti-corruption agencies on the issue of funding? In proffering answers to these questions, the anti-corruption practices and experiences in Hong Kong and Singapore have become the models for consideration. Answers to these questions would presuppose systematic research that will not only X-ray the current situation, but also show and accentuate a good funding model obtained elsewhere. This part is thus the starting point in this research.
Quah’s (
The choice of these countries is informed by the successes recorded by their ACAs – Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) – in the fight against corruption in Hong Kong and Singapore, respectively. Therefore, lessons learnt can help the Nigerian ACAs which citizens perceive to be ineffective in combating corruption. Besides, the two countries did overcome endemic corruption and lessons from successful practices will help to improve and provide sustainable policy measures that can engender lasting solutions to the challenges bedevilling the anti-corruption struggle in Nigeria. This is the pre-occupation of this empirical conversation. The paper is structured into eight sections. The ‘Introduction’ section introduces the study; the ‘Methodology’ section presents the methodology of the study; the ‘Conceptual clarification’ section considers the conceptual clarification and the ‘Theoretical framework’ section elucidates the theoretical framework. In the ‘Funding patterns of anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria’ section, the study examines the funding patterns of the EFCC and the ICPC in combating corruption. The section entitled ‘Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s anti-corruption agencies’ effectiveness in combating corruption’ examines the lessons learnt from Hong Kong and Singapore, while the ‘Conclusion’ section concludes the study.
This is comparative, mixed method research because of the combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry. These were used to compare the funding of ACAs in Nigeria with what was accomplished in the selected countries (Singapore and Hong Kong) of interest. Both primary and secondary sources of data were therefore sourced for the paper.
Two in-depth interview (IDI) sessions were conducted with purposively selected officials of the two agencies in Nigeria who were asked questions, such as: (1) How is your agency funded? (2) What can you say about your agency’s funding from the federal government? (3) Did you have enough personnel in some key departments (prosecution and investigation departments)? The researchers relied on information in journals, textbooks, government publications and gazettes, and newspapers as secondary sources of data which were used to compliment the primary data sourced from the interviewees. Quantitative data were retrieved from the annual reports of the agencies and federal government’s appropriation act for some years, and IDIs, conducted with the officials of the agencies, were recorded, transcribed and subjected to ethnographic summaries and quotations, while secondary data obtained were content-analysed.
Anti-corruption agencies are institutions established by the government or an organisation to combat corruption. Aderounmu (
Funding is an essential component and tool needed by all government agencies and parastatals because it determines their efficiency. It is a source of supply, a stock, a fund of goodwill or a sum of money or other resources set aside for sustainability of their mandate; operations and for other a specific purpose. In a broader sense, funding is an act of providing financial resources, usually in the form of money or other values such as effort or time, to finance a need, programme or project, usually by an organisation or government (Wikipedia
According to Dey (
Corruption is simply a species of more inclusive class, that is, criminally or socially, conduct or behaviour, coded or uncoded … perpetrated primarily for economic gain, and it involves the use and misuse of legitimate forms of commerce, industry, trade-governmental or corporate service and administration as well as some form of organization in the sense of a set or system of more or less formal; relationships between persons perpetrating the corrupt acts. (p. 13)
Comprehensively, Osoba (
The paper is anchored to the systems theory which is an analysis of political life as popularised by David Easton. The central argument of the systems theory, which is also referred to as the Eastonian model, is that the state is a political system (Easton
A simple system.
Anti-corruption agencies play a crucial roles in preventing and fighting corruption and educating people. They must provide the basis for ensuring that the state and its people are free from corruption and the role has been played by the ACAs against the looters and those involved in corruption in Nigeria. Based on the foregoing realities, it is germane to assert that the government should provide enough funding and support to the agencies, but the government, for its part, does not have the required funds to meet some of its obligations. The Nigerian anti-corruption system is, however, facing a serious challenge regarding funding which has a capacity to compromise the extent and effectiveness of anti-corruption struggles. For instance, in 2014, the EFCC cried out that it was being starved of funding and this forced the agency to be chasing weak criminals and 419 (fraud) cases (Akinsola
The effectiveness of ACAs revolves around proper funding and proper funding requires adequate personnel, especially in key areas: resources needed to prosecute and investigate corruption cases, and campaign to educate and enlighten the people regarding the effect of corruption. The ICPC and the EFCC are funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria and some international donors. The funding of the ACAs is shown in a comparative analysis in
A comparative analysis of the allocations to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission from 2003 to 2015.
Year | ICPC | EFCC |
---|---|---|
2003 | ₦412.8 million | ₦100 million |
2004 | ₦459.2 million | ₦1.17 billion |
2005 | ₦818.5 million | ₦1.8 billion |
2006 | ₦1.06 billion | ₦2.1 billion |
2007 | ₦1.9 billion | ₦3 billion |
2008 | ₦3.59 billion | ₦ 3.71 billion |
2009 | ₦2.29 billion | ₦6.28 billion |
2010 | ₦2.34 billion | ₦7.68 billion |
2011 | ₦3.88 billion | ₦13.8 billion |
2012 | ₦3.97 billion | ₦10.6 billion |
2013 | ₦4.41 billion | ₦10.22 billion |
2014 | ₦4.68 billion | ₦10.25 billion |
2015 | ₦4.61 billion | ₦10.47 billion |
ICPC, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission; EFCC, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.
The economic and financial crimes commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission and their percentages of the total amount budgeted.
Year | Total budget allocation (₦) | EFCC allocation (₦) | % | ICPC allocation | % |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2009 | 3 101 813 750 625 | 6 283 499 239 | 0.2 | 2 288 971 594 | 0.1 |
2010 | 4 427 184 595 534 | 7 681 976 779 | 0.2 | 2 325 564 386 | 0.1 |
2011 | 4 226 191 559 254 | 13 854 669 470 | 0.3 | 3 878 472 373 | 0.1 |
2012 | 4 877 209 156 933 | 10 607 150 473 | 0.2 | 3 968 340 697 | 0.1 |
2013 | 4 987 220 425 601 | 10 219 777 967 | 0.2 | 4 405 276 495 | 0.1 |
2014 | 4 642 960 000 000 | 10 245 369 170 | 0.2 | 4 675 887 517 | 0.1 |
2015 | 4 493 363 957 158 | 10 472 982 781 | 0.2 | 4 610 936 843 | 0.1 |
EFFC, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission; ICPC, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission.
From the above table, the allocation to the ICPC from 2009 to 2015 showed a recurring 0.1% of the total budget, while that of the EFCC was 0.2%. It was only in 2011 that the allocation to the EFCC was increased by 0.1% (0.3%). The trend indicates that the Federal Government of Nigeria has not demonstrated any sincere commitment to the fight against corruption if funding is used as a yardstick. The implication of this is that corruption may continue to thrive if adequate funding of ACAs is not guaranteed. According to Owasanoye (
It appears that the high profile defendants have more money at their disposal than the prosecuting agencies. In reality, the accused would appear to spend more money on the trial than the state considering the calibre of legal counsel retained by them. Most of the defence counsels are Senior Advocates of Nigeria (SAN) who are generally believed to be very expensive to retain. (Owasanoye
While briefing the Senate Committee on Drugs, Narcotics, Financial Crimes and Anti-corruption, the EFCC’s representative buttressed the point of underfunding when he declared that:
The Commission had less than ₦2 million in its account. I could recollect when the committee paid us an oversight visit and I did make our financial position known to the committee. As at now, EFCC does not have ₦2 million in its account. We don’t have money … we have been complaining that no money has been released for us for operations … if we can afford to pay salary, that is all. That is the position under which we operate. (
This same underfunding is a major theme emphasised by officials of the two agencies during the interview. The EFCC official observed that:
Most of the funding we get from the federal government is mainly used to pay salaries of our workers. Little is being spent on other areas. This has been affecting our performance in the fight against corruption in Nigeria (Nigerian Tribute, December 17, 2003).
The ICPC Planning, Research and Review (PRR) head also said:
Given the analysis of the allocations from the federal government, these are not sufficient to really fight corruption. If you are to talk of corruption, fighting it is expensive. Besides, Nigeria is a country where we have a large number of people. In other words, Nigeria has a large population and if someone commits an offence of corruption right now, in a few minutes so many people will commit similar offences. That is why I am saying we need much money to carry out our mandates. We spend our allocation on salaries and overheads of public servants while what we have left for items that would assist the agency to meet its mandate areinadequate.
The implication of this is that the tasks of preventing, investigating and prosecuting offenders will be difficult, given the current regression of public funding for these agencies. To show that funding is very important to every successful anti-corruption drive, the study X-rays the successful models of anti-corruption in Singapore and Hong Kong with a view to highlighting the need for adequate funding for the ACAs in Nigeria. The paper will at this stage consider lessons from Hong Kong and Singapore in combating corruption in Nigeria.
Before the advent of the ICAC, ‘corruption was a serious problem in Hong Kong especially during the colonial period’ (Quah
The Chinese who formed its population had long been accustomed to a system where most of an official’s income depended on what he was able to extort from the public. Not surprisingly, during the first decade of the colony’s history, corruption propelled at all levels of government. (p. 123)
Therefore, the ICAC was established on 15 February 1974 with the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance (ICACO). The Commission is autonomous of the civil service and the Commissioner is answerable directly to the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong’s Special Administrative Region. The ICAC is committed to fighting corruption through a three-pronged strategy of effective law enforcement, education and prevention, to maintain Hong Kong as a fair and just society (Hong Kong Facts
The ICAC has been enjoying resounding success in the fight against corruption since 1974. Although it enjoyed marginal success when it was first established, domestic constituents marked its efforts and its signals backed its credibility. However, the reparation and successful prosecution of Peter Godbee increased the ICAC’s credibility. Since then, the ICAC had built an impressive record of investigations that had resulted in numerous convictions. Nowadays, Hong Kong ranks as one of the least corrupt jurisdictions in East Asia, and this reputation is free-wheeling the market economy (Heilbrunn 2004).
The success of the ICAC was attributed to solid budgetary support and stringent laws put in place by the Hong Kong government. For instance, in 2001, the ICAC was appropriated the equivalent of US$90 million, an amount viewed as fully justified when compared with the costs of unchecked corruption (Chan
Besides, three-fourth of the ICAC’s budget is allocated to the Operational Department and many talented officials gravitate to that department. The Corruption Prevention Department funds studies on corruption, conducts seminars for business leaders and helps public and private organisations to identify strategies for reducing corruption. The Department has funded thousands of studies for public sector agencies and businesses in Hong Kong (De Speville
A close examination of the allocation to the ICAC shows that the agency has enjoyed considerable funding from the Hong Kong government because since 1974 the funds allocated to the agency has been increasing.
Hong Kong’s allocation to the Independent Commission Against Corruption (1974–2006).
Year | Budget |
---|---|
1974 | HK$12.9 million |
1987 | HK$193 million |
2001 | HK$686.7 million |
2005 | HK$663 million |
2006 | HK$668.5 million |
The experience of the CPIB in Singapore is also essential because it constitutes an investigative model worthy of emulation by governments around the world. The CPIB was established to respond to corruption in Singapore which also experienced endemic corruption during the colonial period like in Hong Kong. It was when police inspectors stole 1800 tons of narcotics in the 1950s that the government saw the necessity to establish the CPIB which was meant to prevent corruption (Leak
… evidence of the CPIB’s success in reducing corruption is present from Singapore’s highly favourable investment climate that typically ranks among the top twenty recipients of foreign investment in the world in absolute terms. (p. 127)
Funding of the CPIB is also encouraged by the Singaporean government because solid funding, coupled with the political will, has helped the agency to establish its effectiveness in combating corruption.
Budget allocated to corrupt practices investigation bureau by Singapore’s government (1978–2005).
Year | Budget allocated |
---|---|
1978 | $1 024 370 |
1982 | $2 256 900 |
1987 | $4 147 230 |
1989 | $5 094 613 |
1993 | $6 525 834 |
1995 | $8 087 308 |
1997 | $10 225 463 |
2002 | $15 357 665 |
2003 | $19 788 317 |
2004 | $13 447 079 |
2005 | $12 726 405 |
2006 | $12 856 565 |
From the table above, the CPIB’s budget grew by 19 times from $1 024 370 in 1978 to $19 788 317 in 2003. The table also shows that the CPIB’s budget increased gradually from $1 024 370 in 1978 to $2 256 900 in 1982, to $4 147 230 in 1987, and to $5 094 613 in 1989 (Quah
A close examination of the tables indicates that the Hong Kong’s ICAC and Singapore’s CPIB are well-funded and they have adequate staff for performing their functions effectively. Adequate funding and adequate personnel have helped these agencies to be models to other countries across the world in combating corruption across the world.
Having examined the effectiveness of Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s ACAs in combating corruption, it is essential to state some lessons to be learnt from these models by the Nigerian government.
First, the governments of Singapore and Hong Kong show their readiness in combating corruption and their actions were in line with global best practices on successful ACA. According to Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA 2016):
… the global best practices suggest that partnerships supported by the coercive powers of government and its agencies often can lead to better results or lead to changes in reducing corruption (p. 157)
In Singapore, the campaign against corruption is a continuous one and it is led by the political leaders themselves. Also, in Hong Kong, the government demonstrates its political will to fight corruption; it was through the political will that the CIPB’s and ICAC’s budgets were increased, and the agencies were well-funded and well-staffed. Therefore, the Nigerian government should also show its readiness to fight corruption; in other words, Nigerian leaders should learn from these countries and must also commit to fighting corruption through the demonstration of a strong political will.
The low level of political will of successive governments is manifested in
Second, as the fight against corruption is expensive, the Nigerian government must increase the funds allocated to the ACAs. The current recurring allocation of 0.1% and 0.2% to the ICPC and the EFCC are not sufficient for the fight against corruption. As observed, the ICAC’s and CIPB’s financing increased; and even when the money was reduced, they were still well-funded enough to not only pay the salaries of the workers, but also to cater for the institutional structures of the agencies. In other words, the structures needed in combating corruption in these countries are adequate and this adequacy has helped the ACAs to be efficient and effective in combating corruption in the two countries. The current trend in allocations to Nigeria’s ACAs shows that the funds can only be used to pay salaries of workers. Besides, Nigeria’s ACAs have bloated administrations compared to specialist investigators and prosecutors which constitute the line positions of the ACAs in Nigeria. It has been difficult to recruit professionals or specialists in combating corruption in Nigeria because the agencies are underfunded.
Third, in Singapore, the ICAC staff are paid higher salaries than other government officials and they are not affected by civil service administration. This is not obtainable in Nigeria. Politicians and some career officers receive higher salaries than the staff of the ICPC and the EFCC. When the officials of ACAs are well paid, they would not be susceptible to the influence and bribes of people who wield power in the state. Besides, it will make the officials work harder. This is another lesson the Nigerian government should learn from Singapore and Hong Kong.
Fourth, it has been observed by De Speville (
Fifth, the staff-population ratio in the two countries is fairly balanced in terms of fighting corruption relative to Nigeria’s ACAs. For instance, in 2005, Singapore and Hong Kong had total populations of 4.3 million and 7 million, respectively, while their anti-corruption personnel were 81 and 1194, respectively. The staff-population ratios in two countries were 1:53 086 and 1:5663, respectively (Quah
Sixth, as Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s governments have funded the CPIB and ICAC well, the Nigerian government should do likewise. These ACAs need to establish zonal offices in the 36 states of the federation, so that the fight against corruption will receive a boost at the state as well as local government levels. Currently, the EFCC has its headquarters in Abuja and two zonal offices, while the ICPC also has its headquarters in Abuja and 14 zonal offices. Their offices are inadequate considering the numerous Nigerian population. The establishment of zonal offices will boost the fight against corruption.
The conclusion of the article is twofold – the actuality and the potentiality. It is an actuality that the funding of the two ACAs in Nigeria has not been backed with a strong political will. However, the potentiality of the EFCC and the ICPC is still at infancy and they have demonstrated an ineffective and insignificant performance in combating corruption in Nigeria.
The actuality–potentiality levels of the ACAs have been established by the paper that their budgetary allocation is still very low with significant impact on efforts at combating corruption in Nigeria. It has affected their operational skills. Also, the paper has argued that their weak financial base has a correlation with the political will which explains the seeming failure of the major ACAs in combating corruption. Therefore, the stronger the political will, the more generous the funds available to the agencies. The ICAC and CPIB are examples and successful models of anti-corruption to the whole world. Therefore, if the Nigerian government can increase the budgetary allocations to these agencies, the war against corruption will be boosted and better results achieved than the present will be recorded.
The data in the research are treated confidentially by the authors.
The authors declare that there is no financial or personal relationships which may have inappropriately influenced the writing of this article.
A.A was the project leader. A.A. was responsible for writing the introduction, methodology, lessons from other countries and conclusion. S.O. was responsible for the theoretical framework and conceptual clarification. I.J. was responsible for analysis of gross domestic product (GDP) to be set aside for combating corruption and wrote recommendations for the study.