The Office of the Public Service Commission database served as a sampling frame for the departments selected for the study. The population of this study was both national and provincial government departments. National department comprises 46 departments, while provincial department comprises 103 departments. All 46 national departments participated in the study. Of the 103 departments in the South African provinces, 99 participated. To select a group of qualifying senior managers, two sampling methods were used: purposive sampling and stratified sampling. In grouping national and provincial departments, a stratified sampling method was used, which was useful in stratifying other senior managers from each department; 640 senior managers participated in the study. This was followed by a purposive sampling technique to select employee relations senior managers, with a total of 111 participants in the sample. Overall, a total of 751 senior managers participated in the study. The Team PSC, based in both national and provinces, assisted in distributing semi-structured electronic questionnaire to both the national and provincial departments to ensure that the research was successfully conducted.

Data collected from the national and provincial departments were combined and analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis seeks to discover the themes significant in the data at different levels of generating, reviewing, defining and labelling themes (Attride-Stiring 2001). The selection of procedures for data analysis was made on the basis that the procedures were necessary and applicable for designing descriptive and thematic areas.

An application for full ethical approval was made to the Public Service Commission and the permission letter granted to conduct the study, was deemed as an ethical consent by the Commission and departments. This article followed all ethical standards for a research with direct contact with human or animal subjects.

The PSC upholds the Chapter 10, Section 195 Constitutional Values and Principles (CVPs) governing public administration. The following ethical considerations were observed in the study:

Therefore, acceptance of the participation and return of the electronic questionnaire was considered as consent to voluntarily participate in the study.

The construct of discipline is mostly considered as a mechanism to correct or discourage any undesirable behaviour, conduct or attitudes that may be considered disruptive for people, work and social relations (Nel et al. 2016; Gobind 2015; Venter & Levy 2011). In the workplace, the concept ‘discipline’ is associated with the management’s action against both individuals and groups of employees to correct unwanted behaviour, poor performance or to comply with values, norms, standards of professional ethics, process, prescripts and regulations to deter potential transgressions (Knight & Ukpere 2014). Bendix (2017) and Grogan (2014) maintain that for discipline to be significantly functional and successfully achieve its desired result, it needs to be substantially and procedurally fair.

The study was anchored on Arvey and Jones’ (1985) four-stage model, which proffers that, where employees work as a team, that is the South African public service, several areas of interest in the understanding of team-based discipline may be foregrounded. The first stage allows for the observation of the rule infraction and a comparison of the action to the standards and norms of the organisation. The second stage entails the determination of responsibility, which includes attributions about causality, consideration of the consequences of the transgression, the ability and status of the individual. At this stage, individuals decide whether to ignore the transgression or to punish it. The third stage encapsulates the choice of the discipline method. Finally, the fourth stage deals with the employee’s perception of the disciplinary action, which involves perceived equity and social comparison processes. Also considered within this final stage are responses to discipline by both the employee who is punished and their co-employee. The other theories underpinning workplace discipline include Henry’s model (1987), Fenley’s model (1998) and Rollison et al.’s model (Rollison et al. 1997). Henry’s model of workplace discipline comprises punitive-authoritarian, corrective-representative, accommodative-participative and celebrative-collective forms of discipline. Fenley has identified the corrective, punitive and revisionist models of the disciplinary process. Rollison et al. (1997) identified three approaches to discipline, namely rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence. In some ways, these models are similar, yet they also have characteristics that are different (see Shilumani 2020).

In the public service, various legislative and regulatory structures have been introduced in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) to govern the management of discipline, amongst other. The legislative and regulatory structures, amongst others, are Labour Relations Act 1995; Public Service Act 1994; Public Service Regulations 2016; Employment of Educators Act 1998; Public Service Collective Bargaining Council (PSCBC) Resolution 1 of 2003; and General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council (GPSSBC) Resolution 1 of 2006.

An analysis of these legislative and regulatory structures reflects a reciprocal determination of correcting deplorable behaviour, conduct and poor performance, irrespective of entity, sector or organisation, while regulatory structures emphasise uniformity, fairness (substantive and procedural) and transparency in the management of disciplinary cases, regardless of level, status or rank. Moreover, highpoint disciplinary sanctions include counselling, oral warning, written warnings, a final written warning, suspension with pay for a period not more than three months, demotions, a combination of the above or dismissal. These sanctions include minor offences (e.g. lateness, unofficial absence) and serious offences (e.g. theft, bribery, fraud, assault) (Finnemore 2006). For a minor offence, if perpetrated for the first time, counselling and/or an oral warning is fortified, but if the behaviour is notoriously repeated, a written or final written warning may be given, depending on the severity of an offence, followed by a dismissal as a last resort where behaviour continuously occurs. With serious offences, on the other hand, a sanction of an immediate and final written warning may be instituted.

Bendix (2017) and Khola (2016) reiterate that dismissal, as a disciplinary sanction, should be considered as the last resort. Khola (2016) further argues that dismissal is fair, when it merits the fundamental principles as prescribed in the Code of Good Practice:

Discipline management is therefore a fundamental role and obligation of line management and the directorate of human resources as well as employee representatives. To protect employees from unfair and irrational conduct, disciplinary codes, procedures and standards should be consistently implemented in the workplace. These views are corroborated by Knight and Ukpere (2014:589) who aver that line management ‘have an inherent responsibility towards the business in ensuring that their actions are appropriate and consistent within the context of disciplinary action …’. This is the missing puzzle in most public service departments where it concerns administering discipline.

Researchers (Khola 2016; Knight & Ukpere 2014; Manyaka & Nkuna 2014) agree that because of the weaker oversight mechanisms, most senior managers in the public sector do not regularly apply the aforesaid fundamental principles of the Code of Good Practice and other regulations consistently. These managers intentionally misuse their power to discipline the employees they dislike or push them out of the organisation for their own self-interest. Khola (2016) further asserts that it serves no purpose if managers and/or supervisors assigned to impose discipline explicitly or implicitly flout the disciplinary procedures, rules and standards, and no action is taken against them. As a result, they create a toxic and unjust work environment that has a detrimental effect on working relations, motivation and organisational citizenship. Mzangwa (2015) and Van der Bank, Engelbrecht and Strumpher (2008) argue that disciplinary action is appropriate if the management instigates an action against an employee who fails, on a number of occasions, to meet reasonable and legitimate expectations in terms of performance, conduct and compliance with policies and procedures or standards. Effective discipline management depends on the effectiveness and transparency of disciplinary processes that are capable of serving and protecting the interests of all parties in a lawful, reasonable, fair and consistent manner (Small 2017; Khola 2016).

To this end, literature provides an insight into and some viewpoints on effective discipline management. Four principles, namely objectivity, fairness, consistency and transparency, are underlined by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and other subordinate prescripts as paramount keys to ensuring effective discipline management in order to enhance and preserve, amongst other things, reputation, trust relationship, performance, stability (employees and department) and sound working relations in the workplace.

The participants were aware of disciplinary management prescripts, which assist their department in the management and swift completion of disciplinary cases regardless of rank or level, although deceitfully applied. In accordance with Arvey and Jones’ (1985) four-stage model, employee’s perception of the disciplinary action, in the public sector, is perceived as not equitable and socially comparable. However, the deceitful application made it problematic to implement the disciplinary management prescripts consistently as expected. This is evidenced by the following verbatim statement:

This finding is consistent with Kilinç (2019), Knight and Ukpere (2014), who found that leaders in government departments or organisations do not apply discipline consistently, they disobey organisational disciplinary codes of conduct, policies and procedures, and use disciplinary action for their own stereotypes or ulterior motives. This subjectivity is largely attributed to personal predispositions, misuse of power and political pressures associated with officials handling discipline within departments. However, an independent structure such as the PSC is an attempt to ensure that issues of subjectivity in management of discipline within departments are deterred.

The Presidency (2014:5–6) noted that the challenges to implementation of government policies were ‘… politically related, administrative, lack of management accountability, instability of administrative leadership, skills deficit, weakness in the organisational design and low staff morale’. In the same vein, most participants (i.e. senior employee managers) reiterated that favouritism, management–political interference and biasness are common in their departments and negatively thwarted attempts to maintain consistency and trust in the management of disciplinary cases. Therefore, this to some degree makes a disdain of disciplinary prescripts. One participant best summed most responses as follows:

The finding above is consistent with Mogotsi (2013, 2020), Parliament Monitoring Group (2020) and Public Service Commission (2016) findings that subjectivity in the handling of disciplinary cases and dispensing of sanctions has been raised as a serious problem facing the public service in South Africa.

Based on the above responses, it is evident that the participants have an understanding of the prescripts governing disciplinary management. Govender and Bussin (2020:2) noted that ‘leaders in organisations are faced with a challenge of how to build a culture of employee engagement and leverage this as a driver of performance’. Similarly in this study, managers found themselves frustrated by the prospects of being perceived as countering justice, being accomplices to and/or support unprincipled practices, which ultimately complicated their ability to handle disciplinary cases effectively. The success and effectiveness of performance management lie in the quality of the leader and his or her commitment to engage with, provide support to, challenge, coach, give constructive feedback and include his or her employees in activities of the business (Aksoy 2010; Apalia 2017; Gruman & Saks 2011; Kilinç 2019).

Despite the Disciplinary Code and Practice in the Labour Relations Act 1995:

The results in the present study show that some departments ensure fairness and consistency during the disciplinary process and implement sanctions for the same misconduct, irrespective of rank, level or political affiliation. For example, a few participants stated that in cases where unfairness and inconsistencies are identified, decisions are revised and corrected during appeal processes. Others, however, held an opposing view, asserting that fairness and consistency are antagonists in their departments. The participants indicated that most senior managers do, from time to time, lack the commitment to implement disciplinary sanctions, especially if the outcomes are in favour of employees or finalised in their departments. They further mentioned that there are unfair dismissal and victimisation cases that were overturned a long time ago by the labour court or CCMA, where the departments were ordered to reinstate and compensate the claimants, but the employer opted to delay the implementation through wasteful appeal processes. Additionally, most participants pointed out that some employees who are associated with some unions or management are granted lenient sanctions for serious offences whereas others are dismissed for the same offence, which is not fair:

This is an indication that leaders and managers in government departments do not apply discipline consistently, they disobey organizational disciplinary codes, policies and procedures, and use disciplinary action for their own stereotypes or ulterior motives (Knight & Ukpere 2014). According to Labour Relations Act 1995, under sanctioning guidelines for the public service, the primary principle on the implementations of disciplinary sanctions is that employees who are similarly situated must be treated in the same way when disciplinary measures are applied or taken. This could possibly be the reason why disciplinary outcomes pointlessly take lengthy review periods in certain departments; it is to delay implementation.

Scholars such as Apalia 2017; Chai, Ismail & Khan 2021; Cole 2007; Kilinç 2019; Knight & Ukpere 2014; Rettke 2018 substantiate that consistency, fairness and justice are key in the progressive discipline management and reinforcement of positive behaviour in the workplace. However, all the participants concurred that the total management of disciplinary cases is somewhat effective only when dealing with cases involving junior staff, but is indifferent and deceitful when dealing with senior managers. In terms of the PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2003: Disciplinary Code and Procedures in the Public Service, cases should be resolved within 3 months after the initiation and 6 months, at the request of a disciplinary panel chairperson or initiator to acquit themselves with the case (PSCBC 2003). Furthermore, an employee can be placed on suspension if they are alleged to have committed a serious offence, and their availability at work context might interfere with investigations into the alleged misconduct and does not establish a final decision, but such an employee must be on full salary pay (PSC 2011; PSCBC 2003). However, this is not always the norm in the public service, as most participants reiterated that a series of cases are finalised between 4 and 12 months or longer, at worst, it has taken 6–12 months or 3–6 years to finalise disciplinary cases. This has contributed to circumstances in which departments expend enormous amounts paying salaries for suspended employees sitting at home for lengthy periods of time. Some of the reasons given are political and external lawyers’ interferences in internal labour issues; some cases take a long time to finalise because of the complexity of a case, which often includes senior managers who intentionally delay the case with postponements, want to show their financial muscle or political connection, and also the human resources unit deliberately misplacing disciplinary documents. Other participants added that cases of suspension are often imposed on certain officials based on personal feuds rather than credible facts explicitly connecting them to the wrongdoing.

The participants were divided in their opinions with respect to the internal appeals process, with some arguing that some senior managers exploit appeals and ignore the appeal time frames in their departments. When an individual is favoured by the appeal outcome, the senior managers frequently defer the implementation of the appeal outcome. Other participants argued that the appeal process is productive although what seems to be inefficient is the delay in the appointment of independent appeal authorities by the department. In addition, the results show a general feeling that senior managers are well developed to handle disciplinary and/or conflict resolution matters but choose to ignore the code and procedures. Some participants mentioned that retraining senior managers is a waste of time and state money because they are merely implementers of some people’s ulterior mandates. Also of concern, participants repeated that oftentimes, some senior managers do not want to pay heed to the expert advice of some employee relations managers regarding disciplinary matters. These views imply that there are inconsistencies, discrepancies and enough evidence of improper management of disciplinary cases by departments. This is a deviation to both the Constitution and the LRA (No. 66 of 1995) that provide for fair labour practice. The Public Service Act of 1994 that provides for the organisation and administration of the public service in South Africa, the regulation of the conditions of employment, discipline, discharge of members of the public service and other related matters. This is also an aberration to the Disciplinary Code and Procedures, PSCBC Resolution 2 of 1999, which was amended by PSCBC Resolution 1 of 2003. In this regard, proper implementation of the disciplinary code and procedures should yield improved service delivery, sound labour relations and eliminate employees’ exploitation by management.

Literature highlights that inconsistent management of discipline has a negative effect on working relations, trust relationship and loss of institutional memories (Khola 2016; Knight & Ukpere 2014; Luthans 2011; Nduka, Okorie & Ikoro 2019; Tumo 2017). Apalia (2017), Chai et al. (2021) Luthans (2011) and Nduka et al. (2019) argue that when discipline management is consistently and fairly implemented, it is a powerful tool for constructive working relations, trust relationship and influence improvements in employee behaviour and quality of work. The findings in the present study show that the way disciplinary cases are managed makes employees feel frustrated, which negatively affects their working relations and trust. A few participants indicated that the way in which disciplinary cases are implemented in their departments should not affect working relations. Particularly concerning was that some of them alleged that:

Most senior managers across public service departments refuse or are reluctant to deal with disciplinary matters because of fear of victimisation by their superiors and some unions’ representatives. Some senior managers take it personally when a grievance is lodged against their actions, and it thus becomes difficult for employees to continue to work in the same unit.