Outcome-based approaches (OBAs) have become a hallmark of contemporary governance frameworks, reflecting a global shift towards results-based management that emphasises measurable impacts and societal change over procedural compliance and activity tracking (Kusek & Rist 2004/2008; OECD 2023). Outcome-based approach prioritises achieving long-term developmental goals by strategically aligning resources, activities and outputs with clearly defined outcomes that respond to complex socio-economic challenges (World Bank 2022). Central to this approach is the establishment of integrated systems for monitoring, evaluation and accountability, which ensure that public policies and programmes are informed by evidence and are responsive to citizen needs (Phillips et al. 2014; UNDP 2023). Globally, OBA has demonstrated its adaptability and effectiveness in addressing governance inefficiencies and enhancing public sector performance, particularly when accompanied by strong political will, interdepartmental coordination and a culture of accountability. The growing global consensus is that well-institutionalised OBA frameworks can strengthen service delivery, enhance policy coherence and improve developmental outcomes.

Informed by this international context, South Africa’s public sector has also embraced the shift towards results-based governance (Goldman & Mathe 2014). The Government-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWM&ES), introduced in 2005, marked a critical turning point by institutionalising performance-based management principles across all spheres of government (Cloete 2008; Engela & Ajam 2010). This was followed by the adoption of the National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF) in 2011, which established formal standards and expectations for the design, implementation and use of evaluations (The Presidency 2011). These frameworks were designed to embed a culture of evidence-informed decision-making, improve policy execution and align public sector performance with the broader developmental goals articulated in the National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP provides a long-term vision for addressing inequality, poverty and unemployment by 2030 and positions OBA as a mechanism for improving the impact of public service delivery (OECD 2023; Phillips et al. 2014; Goldman et al. 2014). South Africa’s outcomes-based planning model, articulated through its Medium-Term Strategic Frameworks (MTSFs), builds on these principles by setting clear targets and using performance information to track government progress.

However, while the adoption of OBA frameworks is well documented, there remains a significant gap in understanding how these systems are being internalised and implemented in practice across different sectors and levels of government. Existing literature tends to focus on the structural design of M&E systems or on the technical aspects of evaluation, without sufficiently interrogating the broader institutional dynamics that either support or undermine OBA institutionalisation (Engela & Ajam 2010; Goldman et al. 2015). Furthermore, there has been limited empirical work exploring the interface between policy intent and implementation reality, particularly in the South African context. Although the NEPF and related policies emphasise accountability, responsiveness and evidence use, less attention has been paid to the systemic and cultural factors that influence how these principles are interpreted and applied in day-to-day public administration. This research, therefore, responds to a critical gap by offering a detailed analysis of how institutional, operational and governance conditions shape the realisation of OBA in the South African public sector.

The central aim of this study is to critically examine the barriers hindering the successful institutionalisation of OBAs in South Africa. It seeks to understand why, despite the presence of enabling policy frameworks and international best practice models, OBA remains inconsistently applied and unevenly embedded across government institutions. The research problem lies in the disconnect between the formal adoption of OBA principles and their operational execution, which limits the capacity of the state to track performance, allocate resources effectively and respond adaptively to developmental needs. This study addresses the need for a nuanced, empirically grounded analysis of OBA’s implementation landscape, drawing on national policy frameworks, government evaluation reports and scholarly literature. By exploring the institutional conditions that facilitate or hinder reform, the research contributes to the broader discourse on governance transformation, results-based public management and evidence-informed policymaking in South Africa.

The selection criteria for this scoping review were designed to ensure the inclusion of high-quality, contextually relevant and authoritative documents that illuminate the evolution and institutionalisation of OBA within South Africa’s public sector. Informed by Arksey and O’Malley (2005) and expanded by Levac et al. (2010), the criteria focused on the relevance of the documents to OBA principles, their applicability to public sector governance and their contribution to understanding implementation challenges and institutional practices. Priority was given to documents published between 2007 and 2024 to capture shifts in policy and governance trends following the formal adoption of OBA frameworks in South Africa. The review included a diverse set of sources – ranging from formal policy frameworks and strategic planning documents to government-issued evaluation reports and peer-reviewed academic studies – allowing for a balanced integration of both practice-based and theoretical perspectives. Documents were selected based on their empirical rigour, conceptual relevance and their ability to provide insight into government performance management, planning, evaluation strategies and institutional dynamics affecting OBA. This multidimensional inclusion strategy ensured that the study was not confined to abstract theoretical debates but rooted in the lived realities of implementation across the South African public sector.

This study applied a meta-synthesis approach guided by Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase thematic analysis framework to generate conceptual insights from a diverse set of documents related to the institutionalisation of OBA in South Africa. Meta-synthesis, as defined by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007), enabled the integration of findings across policy frameworks, evaluation reports and academic literature, offering a nuanced interpretation beyond surface-level summaries. The analysis unfolded in three stages. In the first, all documents were read twice and manually coded inductively using Braun and Clarke’s open coding method, focusing on themes such as institutional alignment, policy coherence, data systems, accountability mechanisms and political leadership. Codes were organised into an Excel matrix to maintain traceability and allow cross-source comparison while preserving contextual specificity. In the second stage, broader themes were developed by iteratively grouping codes across the different types of documents. This comparative analysis revealed key themes such as ‘fragmented institutional accountability’ and ‘political commitment to results’, with their expression varying between evaluations, policy documents and academic critiques. Thematic mapping helped capture the relationships between sub-themes like poor coordination and weak data systems under overarching categories like governance architecture and institutional culture. In the final stage, refined themes were synthesised and linked to the study’s governance-focused theoretical framing, enabling deeper analysis of how competing institutional logics – performance-based reform versus bureaucratic stability – manifest over time and across documents. By comparing older and newer sources, the analysis also identified evolving interpretations of OBA, ultimately producing a coherent set of theory-informed findings that illuminate the tensions between policy intent and implementation realities, while also identifying critical leverage points for reform.

Ethical clearance to conduct this study was obtained from the University of Johannesburg’s School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy Research Ethics Committee (No. 25PMGPP01).

The institutionalisation of OBA in South Africa’s public sector remains uneven and fragmented, despite the proliferation of policy frameworks and evaluation instruments over the past two decades. A synthesis of key documents – including the Policy Framework for the Government-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (The Presidency 2017), National Evaluation Policy Framework (The Presidency 2019), Performance Assessment Tool (PAT) Framework (The Presidency 2011) and Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (National Treasury 2007) – demonstrates a normative commitment to performance-based governance. However, the review reveals a critical gap in the translation of these principles into practice across different government levels. For example, the 2019–2024 MTSF (DPME, 2014) outlines 81 national indicators, yet these indicators are not consistently disaggregated or aligned with provincial and municipal implementation strategies. The Bi-Annual MTSF Synthesis Report for the Period Ending March 2021 (DPME 2024) reveals that while national targets are being tracked, there is limited feedback from local levels, with inconsistent reporting structures, indicators and data systems. This misalignment is echoed in the Programme of Action Progress Report (The Presidency 2016), which shows substantial disparities in performance data from different departments, indicating a lack of standardisation in M&E practices. In one example, reporting on Outcome 8 (human settlements) lacked coherence between national housing targets and the actual delivery capacity reported by provinces, with no shared indicators or performance baselines to ensure comparability.

Further evidence of fragmentation is found in OBA-related evaluations and governance reviews. The Impact Evaluation of the Outcomes Approach (DPME 2012; National Treasury 2012) revealed that different departments applied divergent methodologies and indicators for the same outcomes, leading to incompatible data sets and weak sectoral integration. This was particularly evident in departments such as Health and Basic Education, where programme-specific performance metrics diverged from national indicators, complicating efforts to assess collective progress. The 25-Year and 30-Year Reviews of South Africa’s Democracy (DPME 2019, 2024) reaffirm these concerns, noting inconsistent use of OBA tools and sporadic enforcement of delivery agreements. The MPAT Implementation Guide (The Presidency 2012) also notes that while departments are required to self-assess performance, many do so using non-standardised methods, undermining cross-departmental comparability. In addition, the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Approach (The Presidency 2014a; The Presidency 2014b) and Improving Government Performance: Our Approach (DPME 2014) recommend integrated planning and reporting systems, yet the persistence of siloed operations remains a defining feature of South Africa’s public administration. For instance, the National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 (The Presidency 2019) calls for institutional coherence and coordinated planning, but evidence from the Midterm Review of Government Priorities (DPME 2012; National Treasury 2012) indicates that national departments continue to use fragmented logframes, impeding shared accountability and collective learning. Moreover, the South African Statistical Quality Assessment Framework (Stats SA 2008) provides standards for quality data generation, yet inconsistent application of these guidelines across institutions leads to a mismatch between planning ambitions and reporting capacity. Lastly, the Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships for Monitoring Frontline Service Delivery (DPME 2011) identifies the need for grassroots feedback mechanisms, but most departmental reports remain focused on upward compliance rather than horizontal integration or downward accountability. These findings collectively point to an OBA system that is well articulated in policy rhetoric but poorly embedded in the operational realities of the state, limiting its capacity to support systemic, evidence-informed governance reform.

The review of government frameworks and evaluation reports highlights serious human, financial and technical capacity constraints that have undermined the institutionalisation of OBA in South Africa’s public sector. While policy instruments such as the National Evaluation Policy Framework (The Presidency 2011), the GWM&ES (The Presidency 2007) and the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (National Treasury 2007) emphasise the importance of performance-based governance, they fall short of detailing mechanisms for capacity investment, particularly in M&E infrastructure and skills development. The 2019–2024 MTSF (DPME 2014) presents ambitious developmental targets but does not allocate dedicated budgets for monitoring functions or clearly outline how departments should build technical capacity to track and report on outcomes. The Bi-Annual 2019–2024 MTSF Synthesis Report (DPME 2024) further notes that while progress is being made on select indicators, capacity gaps – especially in provincial departments – remain a key barrier to comprehensive reporting and adaptive planning. The Programme of Action Progress Report (The Presidency 2016) exposes further weaknesses, indicating that departments often lack trained personnel to execute the full spectrum of evaluation tasks, from baseline development and indicator design to data interpretation and feedback integration.

These capacity issues are compounded by an overreliance on external consultants to fill technical gaps within government institutions. As evidenced in the Impact Evaluation of the Outcomes Approach (DPME 2012; National Treasury 2012), many departments routinely outsource core evaluation functions to private firms, which, while providing short-term technical support, undermines institutional memory and long-term skill development. For instance, in the Department of Social Development’s performance tracking on child and family support programmes, most impact assessments between 2010 and 2016 were conducted by contracted agencies, with minimal knowledge transfer to departmental staff. Similarly, the 25-Year Review of South Africa’s Democracy (DPME 2019) and the 30-Year Review (DPME 2024) note that several line departments continue to rely on ad hoc technical teams funded through donor support or external commissions. This practice is unsustainable and leads to fragmented evaluation practices, with each consultancy applying its own methodology, further weakening data consistency and institutional coherence. The MPAT Implementation Guide (The Presidency 2012) points to recurring challenges in staff retention, especially for roles requiring expertise in data analytics, performance auditing and results-based planning. Additionally, the PAT Framework (The Presidency 2011) and the Principles and Approach to Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (The Presidency 2014b) both acknowledge that most departmental M&E units are either understaffed or operationally marginalised, lacking influence in budgetary and planning decisions.

Despite the existence of formal frameworks promoting OBA, cultural resistance within South Africa’s public sector continues to undermine the institutionalisation of meaningful M&E practices. While documents such as the National Evaluation Policy Framework (The Presidency 2011) and the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Approach (The Presidency 2014b) stress accountability and transparency, the prevailing culture in many departments remains averse to critical performance assessment. This is evident in the 2019–2024 MTSF (DPME 2014), which highlights progress across various outcomes but rarely engages with underperformance or implementation failure in a detailed or reflective manner. The Bi-Annual 2019–2024 MTSF Synthesis Report (DPME 2024) reflects similar tendencies – while reporting is frequent, the narrative remains largely descriptive and success oriented, with limited analysis of bottlenecks, systemic inefficiencies or policy trade-offs. In both cases, departments appear to comply with reporting obligations more as an administrative requirement than as a vehicle for learning or adaptation. For example, in Outcome 3 (related to public safety), numerous implementation delays and shortfalls were acknowledged but not interrogated in a way that could meaningfully inform future planning or corrective action.

The preference for internally led evaluations also perpetuates a culture of defensiveness. The Impact Evaluation of the Outcomes Approach (DPME 2012; National Treasury 2012) and the MPAT Implementation Guide (The Presidency 2012) reveal that performance reviews are often conducted by the same departments being evaluated, leading to a lack of independence, limited objectivity and minimal critique of programme assumptions or implementation failures. This tendency is confirmed by the 25-Year and 30-Year Reviews of South Africa’s Democracy (DPME 2019, 2024), both of which emphasise government achievements without consistently addressing unmet outcomes or explaining variance in departmental performance. Furthermore, the Programme of Action Progress Report (The Presidency 2016) illustrates that indicators are often reported on in aggregate without disaggregated or comparative data, making it difficult to detect gaps between intention and impact. The Guide to the Outcomes Approach (The Presidency 2010a) calls for iterative reflection and evidence-based adjustment, yet this ethos is not consistently practised. Even when evaluations are conducted, there is limited evidence of how findings are integrated into planning and policy revisions. For instance, the Midterm Review of Government Priorities (DPME 2012) notes minimal follow-through in departments where outcome indicators were not met, suggesting that learning is not institutionalised. The Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships (DPME 2011) envisions a participatory culture of evaluation, but in practice, there is little space for public feedback to challenge official narratives. This points to an underlying bureaucratic culture that equates evaluation with punitive oversight rather than developmental learning. The PAT Framework (The Presidency 2011), while technically rigorous, has had limited success in shifting organisational norms towards reflexivity and adaptive management. The same is true for the South African Statistical Quality Assessment Framework (Stats SA 2008), whose standards are rarely applied to internal reviews. Ultimately, these cultural barriers reinforce a compliance-driven M&E environment that privileges box-ticking and risk aversion over critical inquiry, innovation or responsiveness – undermining the potential of OBA to generate transformative change in governance.

An analysis of key planning and performance documents reveals that South Africa’s public sector suffers from an overproduction of indicators, many of which are poorly designed, inconsistently applied or disconnected from actual policy outcomes. The Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2019–2024 (DPME 2014) outlines 81 national indicators across multiple priority outcomes; however, the Bi-Annual 2019–2024 MTSF Synthesis Report (DPME 2024) notes that this sheer volume has contributed to reporting fatigue, indicator duplication and difficulties in prioritisation. For example, within Outcome 1 (Education), departments report on upwards of 20 indicators – some of which are process focused (e.g., teacher training days) and others output based (e.g., number of textbooks distributed) – but with little indication of how these are linked to long-term learning outcomes or educational equity. Furthermore, the Programme of Action Progress Report (The Presidency 2016) highlights significant challenges in aggregating performance data across departments because of inconsistent indicator definitions, timelines and data collection methodologies. In many cases, similar programmes across different provinces use varying metrics for tracking performance, which renders comparative analysis nearly impossible and undermines the ability of central departments such as DPME and the National Treasury to provide coherent performance synthesis or policy feedback.

The MPAT Implementation Guide (The Presidency 2012) and the PAT Framework (The Presidency 2011) both emphasise indicator alignment and relevance; yet findings from the Impact Evaluation of the Outcomes Approach (DPME 2012) show that many departments struggle with indicator inflation, using too many loosely specified measures that dilute focus and create an administrative overload. For instance, the Department of Human Settlements included more than 40 indicators under Outcome 8 between 2014 and 2019, with several overlapping in scope and measuring tangential processes (e.g., number of planning meetings held) rather than final housing delivery outcomes. Similarly, in Outcome 9 (responsive, accountable local government), municipalities were burdened with numerous reporting obligations under the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (National Treasury 2007), many of which lacked clear baselines or targets. The South African Statistical Quality Assessment Framework (Stats SA 2008) provides guidance on indicator design, yet its application across departments remains uneven. Even documents such as the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Approach (The Presidency 2014b) and the Guide to the Outcomes Approach (The Presidency 2010a) call for fewer, sharper indicators tied to results chains, but the institutional response has remained compliance driven, with departments attempting to demonstrate coverage rather than strategic focus. The 25-Year and 30-Year Reviews of South Africa’s Democracy (DPME 2019, 2024) also observe that indicator tracking has become a mechanistic exercise, with indicators often reported in the absence of accompanying analysis or critical reflection. The Improving Government Performance: Our Approach green paper (DPME 2014) similarly critiques the emphasis on quantity over impact, noting that many departments measure what is easiest to report rather than what is most meaningful for policy responsiveness. Ultimately, the result is a crowded and fragmented indicator landscape that obscures rather than clarifies performance, placing significant strain on already overstretched public sector staff and weakening the overall integrity of the OBA system.

The review of South Africa’s government performance documentation reveals that one of the most persistent barriers to the institutionalisation of OBA is the weak integration between evaluation findings, planning processes and budgetary decision-making. While frameworks such as the National Evaluation Policy Framework (The Presidency 2011), the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (National Treasury 2007) and the GWM&ES (The Presidency 2007) articulate the need for a coherent system that aligns planning and budgeting with performance results, there is scant evidence that this integration is occurring in practice. The MTSF 2019–2024 (DPME 2014) and its 2024 Bi-Annual Synthesis Report (DPME 2024) reveal a disjuncture between the formulation of outcome indicators and their uptake in budget formulation. For instance, although Outcome 7 (focused on rural development and food security) was assigned a set of indicators, the Programme of Action Progress Report (The Presidency 2016) shows that budget allocations continued to follow historical expenditure patterns with limited adjustments in response to performance trends. In addition, the Impact Evaluation of the Outcomes Approach (DPME 2012) illustrates that while some departments conduct detailed performance reviews, these reviews rarely result in budget reprioritisation or reallocation to high-impact areas. Instead, evaluations are filed as compliance exercises, disconnected from resource planning and departmental budget submissions to Treasury.

This disconnect is further reflected in institutional arrangements. The MPAT Implementation Guide (The Presidency 2012) notes that many departments complete strategic and annual performance plans without fully incorporating the lessons from past evaluations or outcome data. The 25-Year Review and 30-Year Review of South Africa’s Democracy (DPME 2019, 2024) both highlight instances where departments met only a portion of their outcome targets, yet continued to receive stable or increased budget allocations. This pattern suggests that evaluation findings are not used systematically to inform fiscal decisions, undermining the principles of accountability and performance-based management. The Midterm Review of the Priorities of Government (DPME 2012; National Treasury 2012) emphasises this same issue, citing a lack of structured platforms for departments to present evaluation findings to budgeting committees or planning units. Moreover, although the Guide to the Outcomes Approach (The Presidency 2010b) recommends linking departmental delivery agreements to planning and budgeting cycles, implementation remains uneven and fragmented. The Performance Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Approach (The Presidency 2014a) and the Improving Government Performance: Our Approach document (DPME 2014) reinforce the need for integrated planning-evaluation-budgeting systems, but no concrete interdepartmental mechanism has been instituted to operationalise this alignment. Even the Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships (DPME 2011), while promoting feedback loops for accountability, does not specify how this citizen evidence should influence budgetary priorities. The South African Statistical Quality Assessment Framework (Stats SA 2008) provides technical guidance on data usability but does not address how data inform fiscal planning. Ultimately, this institutional fragmentation limits the capacity of the government to adjust programme designs, scale up successful interventions or defund underperforming initiatives based on evidence. Evaluation remains sidelined from core governance decisions, weakening the strategic value of OBA and perpetuating a resource allocation model that is reactive rather than evidence driven.

South Africa should embed evaluation-use mandates within the PFMA and Treasury Regulations. Drawing on Chile’s experience, where evaluation results directly inform the Ministry of Finance’s budget decisions, South Africa could require departments to submit annual performance evidence summaries alongside MTEF bids. These should include completed evaluations, progress on outcome targets and documented use of findings. National Treasury and DPME should co-chair an ‘Evaluation-Budget Integration Task Team’ to ensure alignment and enforce performance-based funding reallocations.

A National Outcomes Secretariat (NOS) should be created within DPME to function as the institutional anchor for all OBA-related planning, monitoring and evaluation activities. Inspired by Australia’s Productivity Commission and Colombia’s Department of National Planning, this unit would develop common indicator standards, validate evaluation quality, consolidate performance data and facilitate interdepartmental learning forums. It would also manage a digital outcomes dashboard accessible to Parliament and the public, enhancing transparency and sector-wide coordination.

South Africa must move towards a certified M&E profession in the public service. The National School of Government (NSG), in collaboration with SAMEA and universities, should develop an accredited, tiered M&E competency framework linked to career progression. Departments should be required to appoint dedicated M&E specialists, trained in data analysis, evaluation synthesis and adaptive planning. This professionalisation will reduce reliance on consultants and embed evaluation literacy within institutional structures.

To enhance credibility and foster adaptive governance, South Africa should institutionalise third-party and citizen-based evaluations. Drawing from participatory evaluation practices in Kenya and the Philippines, DPME should establish an Independent Evaluation Panel that conducts periodic reviews of key national outcomes. Simultaneously, departments should be mandated to co-design monitoring tools (e.g., community scorecards and digital platforms) with civil society organisations to ensure performance data reflect the lived experience and drive bottom-up accountability.